| Description |
1 online resource (xix, 288 pages) : illustrations |
| Physical Medium |
polychrome |
| Description |
text file |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 265-284) and index. |
| Summary |
"Develops a partisan theory of foreign direct investment (FDI) to explain variance in the regulation of foreign investment and in the amount of FDI inflows that countries receive"-- Provided by publisher. |
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"The territorial state which dominated the industrial era is increasingly becoming obsolete, and is gradually being replaced by new forms of global governance (Ohmae, 1995; Strange, 1996, 1998; Rosecrance, 1999). Moreover, the pressure from global markets have blurred the ideological differences among political parties not only among developed countries, but particularly in the developing world: to stay competitive in the global marketplace governments of the left and the right alike have become fanatical advocates of the neo-liberal cause (see, among others, Edwards (1995); Williamson (1990); Garrett (2000)). The conclusion is that when dealing with global market forces politics does not matter any more, if it ever did. On the opposing side of the debate we find claims that the incentives and constraints created by global economic forces lead to policy divergence rather than convergence (Tiebout, 1956; Vogel, 1996; Berger and Dore, 1996; Kahler, 1998; Kahler and Lake, 2003). The patterns of divergence are systematic: they depend as much on the preferences of the actors as they react to the constraints and opportunities created by global forces (Cameron, 1978; Rodrik, 1997). Scholars ascribing to this tradition argue that governments have ample room to maneuver, and make policy choices that are a clear reflection of their types (Swank, 1998; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Swank and Steinmo, 2002). The heated debate on the consequences of globalization, present in politics, journalism and academia, is far from settled. Changes in global production spearheaded by multinational corporations are a central characteristic of the current era of globalization (Bordo et al., 1999)"-- Provided by publisher. |
| Contents |
List of Figures; List of Tables; Acknowledgments; 1 Domestic Coalitions and the Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment; 1.1 Globalization of Production and Politics; 1.2 Domestic Coalitions and the Political Economy of FDI; 1.3 Political Alignment and Foreign Investment; 1.4 Trends in FDI; 1.5 FDI in the Literature; 1.5.1 Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment; 1.5.2 Political Explanations of FDI; 1.6 A Partisan Theory of FDI; 1.6.1 Preferences; 1.6.2 Organization and Influence; 1.6.3 Domestic Politics and FDI Performance. |
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1.6.4 FDI Performance As a Bargain BetweenInvestors and Governments1.6.5 Exchanging Hostages to Support Economic Exchanges; 1.6.6 Pro-Labor and the Left; 1.6.7 Opportunism and Time-Inconsistency; 1.7 Conclusion; 1.7.1 Layout of the Book; 2 A Political Economy Model of Foreign Direct Investment; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Politics of Investment; 2.3 Distributive Concerns, Partisanship, and Regulation; 2.3.1 Autonomous Government and FDI; 2.3.2 Foreign Investment and Distributive Concerns; 2.3.3 Intuition and Discussion; 2.4 Conclusion; Appendix 2.1; Partisan Government, Taxes, and Investment. |
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3 Tying Hands or Exchanging Hostages3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Investment Risk, Politics, and Commitment; 3.3 Partisanship As a Commitment Mechanism; 3.3.1 Partisan Investment in a Dynamic Setting; 3.4 Political Influence On and Off the Equilibrium Path; 3.4.1 Labor, Business, and Investment Regimes; 3.4.2 Investment and Taxation Off the Equilibrium Path; 3.5 Testable Implications; 3.6 Conclusion; 4 Partisan Governments and Foreign Direct Investment; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Partisanship and FDI Regulation; 4.2.1 Estimating a Measure of Investment Restrictions: Methodology; 4.2.2 Empirical Strategy. |
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4.2.3 Analyses4.3 Partisanship and Investment Flows; 4.3.1 Determinants of Foreign Investment; 4.3.2 Methodology; 4.3.3 Dependent Variable; 4.3.4 Explanatory Variables; 4.3.5 Controls; 4.3.6 Effect of Partisanship on FDI Openness; 4.3.7 Time-Series Cross-Section Data from OECD Countries; 4.3.8 OECD Panel Results; 4.3.9 Gravity Model: Developing and Emerging Countries (1980 -- 2000); 4.4 Conclusion; Appendix 4.1: Data Sources and Description; Dependent Variables; Explanatory Variables; Controls; Sample for Investment Policy Orientation Index; Samples for GMM Models (1972 -- 2002). |
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TSCS Model: Time-Series Cross-Section Panel of FourteenOECD CountriesGravity Model Sample; 5 Labor and Business Influence, Investment Regimes, and Foreign Investment; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Background; 5.3 Labor Influence and Investment Regimes; 5.3.1 FDI Performance Under Alternating Coalitions; 5.3.2 Regression Analysis; 5.4 Labor Influence in Argentina; 5.4.1 Labor Organization and Influence; 5.4.2 Labor Influence and Foreign Direct Investment; 5.4.3 The Advent of Peronism and Organized Labor; 5.4.4 Foreign Investment Regimes in Argentina; 5.5 Conclusion; Appendix 5.1; Data Sources. |
| Local Note |
eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America |
| Subject |
Investments, Foreign.
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Investments, Foreign. |
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Right and left (Political science)
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Right and left (Political science) |
| Genre/Form |
Electronic books.
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| Other Form: |
Print version: Pinto, Pablo Martín. Partisan investment in the global economy 9781107019102 (DLC) 2012029379 (OCoLC)805390935 |
| ISBN |
9781139625357 (electronic book) |
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1139625357 (electronic book) |
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1139094076 (electronic book) |
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9781139094078 (electronic book) |
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9781139616058 |
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1139616056 |
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9781107019102 |
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1107019109 |
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9781107617360 |
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1107617367 |
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