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BestsellerE-book
Author Adolph, Christopher, 1976- author.

Title Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality / Christopher Adolph.

Publication Info. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Item Status

Description 1 online resource (xxiii, 357 pages) : illustrations.
Physical Medium polychrome
Description text file
Series Cambridge series in comparative politics
Cambridge studies in comparative politics.
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references (pages 319-342) and index.
Summary "Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks."--Provided by publisher.
Contents 1. Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance -- 3. Central banker careers and inflation in industrial democracies -- 4. Careers and monetary policy process -- 5. Careers and inflation in developing countries -- 6. How central bankers use their independence -- 7. Partisan governments, labor unions, and monetary policy -- 8. Politics of central banker appointment -- 9. Politics of central banker tenure -- 10. Conclusion: The Dilemma of Discretion.
Local Note eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America
Subject Monetary policy.
Monetary policy.
Banks and banking, Central -- Political aspects.
Banks and banking, Central -- Political aspects.
Banks and banking, Central.
Bureaucracy.
Bureaucracy.
Genre/Form Electronic books.
Other Form: Print version: Adolph, Christopher, 1976- Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2013 9781107032613 (DLC) 2012027612 (OCoLC)800720605
ISBN 9781139616812 (electronic book)
1139616811 (electronic book)
9781139626118 (electronic book)
1139626116 (electronic book)
9781139622394
1139622390
9781139506762 (electronic book)
1139506765 (electronic book)
9781107032613
110703261X
9781139613095 (EBL)
113961309X