Description |
1 online resource (37 pages). |
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text file |
Series |
IMF working paper ; WP/12/204
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IMF working paper ; WP/12/204.
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Note |
Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed Aug. 13, 2012). |
Summary |
This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation. |
Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references. |
Note |
"Middle East and Central Asia Dept." |
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"August 2012." |
Local Note |
eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America |
Subject |
Economic assistance.
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Economic assistance. |
Genre/Form |
Electronic books.
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Added Author |
Moers, Luc.
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International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Department.
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ISBN |
1475559577 electronic book |
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9781475559576 electronic book |
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