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Bestseller
BestsellerE-book
Author Annen, Kurt, 1967-

Title Donor competition for aid impact, and aid fragmentation / prepared by Kurt Annen and Luc Moers.

Publication Info. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, [2012]
©2012

Item Status

Description 1 online resource (37 pages).
text file
Series IMF working paper ; WP/12/204
IMF working paper ; WP/12/204.
Note Title from PDF title page (IMF Web site, viewed Aug. 13, 2012).
Summary This paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors' budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors' maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation.
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references.
Note "Middle East and Central Asia Dept."
"August 2012."
Local Note eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America
Subject Economic assistance.
Economic assistance.
Genre/Form Electronic books.
Added Author Moers, Luc.
International Monetary Fund. Middle East and Central Asia Department.
ISBN 1475559577 electronic book
9781475559576 electronic book