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005    20190705070218.7 
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007    cr cnu---unuuu 
008    150430t20152015mau     ob    001 0 eng d 
020    9780262327374|q(electronic book) 
020    0262327376|q(electronic book) 
020    |z9780262028950|q(print) 
035    (OCoLC)908192421 
037    22573/ctt17kkn6v|bJSTOR 
037    8486|bMIT Press 
037    9780262327374|bMIT Press 
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050  4 B53|b.D484 2015eb 
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072  7 PHI026000|2bisacsh 
072  7 PHI031000|2bisacsh 
082 04 121/.3|223 
090    B53|b.D484 2015eb 
100 1  Deutsch, Max,|d1971-|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/names
       /n2015004585|eauthor. 
245 14 The myth of the intuitive :|bexperimental philosophy and 
       philosophical method /|cMax Deutsch. 
264  1 Cambridge, Massachusetts ;|aLondon, England :|bA Bradford 
       Book, The MIT Press,|c[2015] 
264  4 |c©2015 
300    1 online resource (xx, 194 pages). 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
337    computer|bc|2rdamedia 
338    online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 
340    |gpolychrome|2rdacc 
347    text file|2rdaft 
490 1  Bradford Book 
504    Includes bibliographical references (pages 183-188) and 
       index. 
505 00 |tVarieties of Xphi, pragmatic distortion, and the no-
       theory theory of intuitions --|tIntuitions and 
       counterexamples --|tRelocation problem and Williamson on 
       "judgment skepticism" --|tEvidence for the evidence : 
       arguing for gettier judgments --|tMore evidence for the 
       evidence and the relocation problem redux --|tOther 
       replies to Xphi : the expertise and multiple concepts 
       replies --|tConclusion : armchairs vs. lab-coats? 
520    "In The myth of the intuitive, Max Deutsch defends the 
       methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical 
       challenge mounted by the practitioners of experimental 
       philosophy (xphi). This challenge concerns the extent to 
       which analytic philosophy relies on intuition--in 
       particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers 
       treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical 
       conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic 
       philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on 
       people's intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought 
       experiments. Deutsch argues forcefully that this view of 
       traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of 
       'metaphilosophical folklore, ' and he supports his 
       argument with close examinations of results from xphi and 
       of a number of influential arguments in analytic 
       philosophy. Analytic philosophy makes regular use of 
       hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but, 
       Deutsch writes, philosophers argue for their claims about 
       what is true or not true in these examples and thought 
       experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that 
       are treated as evidence for the claims. Deutsch discusses 
       xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of 
       other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous 
       arguments as Gettier's refutation of the JTB (justified 
       true belief) theory and Kripke's Gödel Case argument 
       against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that 
       they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds 
       existing critiques of xphi, the 'Multiple Concepts' and 
       'Expertise' replies, to be severely lacking"--MIT CogNet. 
588 0  Print version record. 
590    eBooks on EBSCOhost|bEBSCO eBook Subscription Academic 
       Collection - North America 
650  0 Methodology.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/
       sh85084414 
650  0 Philosophy|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/
       sh85100849|xResearch.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/
       subjects/sh2002006576 
650  0 Intuition.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/
       sh85067653 
650  7 Methodology.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/1018722 
650  7 Philosophy|xResearch.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/
       1060805 
650  7 Philosophy.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/1060777 
650  7 Intuition.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/977856 
653    PHILOSOPHY/General 
653    PHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General 
655  4 Electronic books. 
776 08 |iPrint version:|aDeutsch, Max, 1971-|tMyth of the 
       intuitive|z9780262028950|w(DLC)  2014034368
       |w(OCoLC)897401884 
830  0 Bradford book.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/
       n83745008 
856 40 |uhttps://rider.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://
       search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&
       db=nlebk&AN=986382|zOnline eBook via EBSCO. Access 
       restricted to current Rider University students, faculty, 
       and staff. 
856 42 |3Instructions for reading/downloading the EBSCO version 
       of this eBook|uhttp://guides.rider.edu/ebooks/ebsco 
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