| Description |
1 online resource (395 pages) |
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text file |
| Note |
Originally published in 1971, and now published with a new foreword, this is a book of enduring value and lasting relevance. The authors detail the application, history, and controversies surrounding the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), used to evaluate military needs and to choose among alternatives for meeting those needs. |
| Contents |
Unfinished business, 1961 -- New concepts and new tools to shape the defense program -- Why independent analysts? -- NATO strategy and forces -- Nuclear strategy and forces -- Yardsticks of sufficiency -- Three controversial program decisions -- Some problems in wartime defense management -- Unfinished business, 1969. |
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Cover; Introduction to the New Edition; Foreword to the New Edition; Preface; Contents; Tables; Chapter 1 -- Unfinished Business, 1961; Chapter 2 -- New Concepts and New Tools to Shape the Defense Program; Chapter 3 -- Why Independent Analysts?; Chapter 4 -- NATO Strategy and Forces; Chapter 5 -- Nuclear Strategy and Forces; Chapter 6 -- Yardsticks of Sufficiency; Chapter 7 -- Three Controversial Program Decisions; Source Notes; Index; About the Authors. |
| Summary |
A work of enduring value and lasting relevance, this book is both a classic account of the application of powerful ideas to the problem of managing the Department of Defense (DoD) and a cautionary history of the controversies inspired by that successful effort. Robert S. McNamara took office in 1961 convinced that the Secretary of Defense, rather than the services, should control the evaluation of military needs and should choose among alternatives for meeting those needs. His device was a new system for allocating defense resources, the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), whic. |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 339-348) and index. |
| Local Note |
JSTOR Books at JSTOR Open Access |
| Language |
English. |
| Subject |
United States. Department of Defense -- History -- 20th century.
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United States. Department of Defense. |
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History. |
| Chronological Term |
20th century |
| Subject |
Military planning -- United States -- History -- 20th century.
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Military planning. |
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United States. |
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United States -- Armed Forces -- Management -- History -- 20th century.
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Armed Forces. |
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Management. |
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United States -- Armed Forces -- Cost control -- History -- 20th century.
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Cost control. |
| Chronological Term |
1900-1999 |
| Genre/Form |
History.
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Electronic books.
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| Other Form: |
Print version: Enthoven, Alain C. How Much Is Enough? : Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969. Santa Monica : RAND Corporation, ©2007 9780833038265 |
| ISBN |
9780833048141 (electronic book) |
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0833048147 (electronic book) |
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1282451278 |
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9781282451278 |
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