| Edition |
First edition. |
| Description |
1 online resource (293 pages) : illustrations |
| Physical Medium |
polychrome |
| Description |
text file |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| Contents |
Part I. The mechanism : Perception as causal inference : Constraints on perceptual inference ; Perception and Bayes' rule ; Perceptual inference and binocular rivalry ; How do neurons know Bayes? ; From inference to phenomenology ; A hierarchy of causal regularities ; Perceptual variance and invariance ; Message passing between hierarchical levels ; Additional constraints on hierarchical inference ; On Bayes' rule ; Summary: Hierarchical neuronal inferential mechanisms -- Prediction error minimization : A statistical illustration ; Reconceiving the relation to the world ; Being supervised by the world ; A deeper perspective ; Recognition and model inversion ; Summary: Perception in prediction -- Prediction error, context, and precision : Context and uncertainty ; Plugging the leaky dam ; Expected precisions ; Precisions and prediction error gain ; The basic mechanism: matters arising ; Summary: Passive perceivers? -- Action and expected experience : Active inference in perception ; Modelling the agent, and acting ; Bounding surprise ; Active inference: matters arising ; Prediction error minimization: challenges ; Summary: Tooling up for understanding the mind -- Part II. The world : Binding is inference : The binding problem and causal inference ; Initial pleas for the Bayesian story ; From common cause to sensory binding ; Binding, attention, and precision ; Summary: Binding in error minimization -- Is predicting seeing? : Cognitive penetrability: initial moves ; Cognitive penetrability under mounting uncertainty ; Making room for cognitive impenetrability ; Possible cases of cognitive penetrability ; Summary: A balanced notion of cognitive penetrability -- Precarious prediction : Trading off perception and misperception ; Accuracy and noise ; Precisions, sampling, and prior belief ; Reality testing ; The courtroom of perception ; Mental illness and prediction error ; Delusions and expected precisions ; Autism and expected precisions ; Balancing passive and active inference ; Summary: Prediction error failures in illness and health -- Surprise and misrepresentation : Misperception as failure of prediction error minimization ; Misperception and rule-following ; Hierarchical modes of presentation ; In the Bayesian room ; Summary: A mechanism for representation -- Part III. The mind : Precision, attention, and consciousness : From mental searchlight to precision expectations ; Learning patterns of noise and uncertainty ; Patterns of expected precisions in attention ; Volitional attention as active inference ; Inattentional blindness as low gain and prior ; Endogenous and exogenous attention ; Attention and conscious perception ; Summary: Statistical aspects of attention and consciousness -- Perceptual unity in action : From causal inference to consciousness? ; Perceptual unity ; Unity, and ignition of the global neuronal workspace ; Ignition, active inference, and unity ; Action-based unity and indirectness ; Summary: Unity and causal seclusion -- The fragile mirror of nature : Truth trackers or just a penchant for error minimization? ; Is perception indirect? ; The Bayesian body ; Fragility, internality, and situatedness ; Summary: A disconcerting and comforting perceptual relation? -- Into the predictive mind : Emotions and bodily sensations ; Introspection is inference on mental causes ; The private mind in interaction ; The self as a sensory trajectory ; Summary: The probabilistic and causal mind -- Concluding remarks: the mind in prediction. |
| Summary |
A new theory is taking hold in neuroscience. It is the theory that the brain is essentially a hypothesis-testing mechanism, one that attempts to minimise the error of its predictions about the sensory input it receives from the world. It is an attractive theory because powerful theoretical arguments support it, and yet it is at heart stunningly simple. Jakob Hohwy explains and explores this theory from the perspective of cognitive science and philosophy. The key argument throughout The Predictive Mind is that the mechanism explains the rich, deep, and multifaceted character of our conscious perception. It also gives a unified account of how perception is sculpted by attention, and how it depends on action. The mind is revealed as having a fragile and indirect relation to the world. Though we are deeply in tune with the world we are also strangely distanced from it. The first part of the book sets out how the theory enables rich, layered perception. The theory's probabilistic and statistical foundations are explained using examples from empirical research and analogies to different forms of inference. The second part uses the simple mechanism in an explanation of problematic cases of how we manage to represent, and sometimes misrepresent, the world in health as well as in mental illness. The third part looks into the mind, and shows how the theory accounts for attention, conscious unity, introspection, self and the privacy of our mental world. -- Provided by publisher. |
| Local Note |
eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America |
| Subject |
Cognitive neuroscience.
|
|
Cognitive neuroscience. |
|
Perception.
|
|
Perception. |
| Genre/Form |
Electronic books.
|
| Other Form: |
Print version: Hohwy, Jakob. Predictive mind. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013 1 volume ; 24 cm. 9780199682737 9780199686735 (OCoLC)866836560 |
| ISBN |
9780191505195 (electronic book) |
|
0191505196 (electronic book) |
|
9780199682737 |
|
9780199686735 |
|
0199682739 |
|
0199686734 |
|
