Title Voting for policy, not parties : how voters compensate for power sharing / Orit Kedar.

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Description	1 online resource (xiv, 220 pages) : illustrations.
Physical Medium	polychrome
Description	text file
Series	Cambridge studies in comparative politics
	Cambridge studies in comparative politics.
Bibliography	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Contents	Voting for policy. Introduction: institutional sources of voter choice ; A theory of compensatory vote -- Empirical evidence: how voters compensate for diffusion of power. Compensatory vote in parliamentary democracies ; Balancing strong (and weak) presidents ; Compensatory vote in federations: evidence from Germany -- Theoretical implications.
Local Note	eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America
Subject	Voting.
	Voting.
	Political parties.
	Political parties.
	Political planning.
	Political planning.
	Representative government and representation.
	Representative government and representation.
	Public opinion.
	Public opinion.
	Comparative government.
	Comparative government.
Genre/Form	Electronic books.
Other Form:	Print version: Kedar, Orit. Voting for policy, not parties. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2009 9780521764575 (DLC) 2009009401 (OCoLC)313018334
ISBN	9780511658389 (electronic book)
	0511658389 (electronic book)