| Description |
1 online resource (xxiv, 681 pages) : illustrations |
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data file |
| Physical Medium |
polychrome |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| Summary |
This handbook brings together the latest research on applied market design. It surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as law clerks and judges or patients and kidney donors. |
| Contents |
Cover; Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Contributors; Introduction; PART I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES; 1. What Have We Learned From Market Design?; 2. Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior; 3. Using and Abusing Auction Theory; PART II: CASES; SECTION II. A: MATCHING MARKETS; 4. Market Design for Kidney Exchange; 5. School Choice; 6. Improving Efficiency in School Choice; 7. Can the Job Market for Economists Be Improved?; 8. Designing Markets for Ideas; 9. Redesigning Microcredit; SECTION II. B: AUCTIONS. |
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10. The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods11. Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions; 12. Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billitoris Ekati Diamonds; SECTION II. C: E-COMMERCE; 13. Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior; 14. Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents; 15. The Design of Online Advertising Markets; 16. Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting 60 Billion of Sourcing. |
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17. Designing Automated Markets for Communication BandwidthSECTION II. D: LAW DESIGN; 18. A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems; 19. Legislation with Endogenous Preferences; PART III: EXPERIMENTS; 20. Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled-Assets Reverse Auction; 21. Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment; 22. Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions; 23. The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill; PART IV: COMPETING DESIGNS; 24. Competing Mechanisms; 25. Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets; Index; A. |
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BC; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; U; W; Y. |
| Local Note |
eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America |
| Subject |
Markets -- Mathematical models.
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Markets -- Mathematical models. |
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Markets. |
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Supply and demand.
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Supply and demand. |
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Statistical matching.
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Game theory.
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Statistical matching. |
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Game theory. |
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Industries -- General. |
| Genre/Form |
Electronic books.
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| Added Author |
Vulkan, Nir, editor.
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Roth, Alvin E., 1951- editor.
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Neeman, Zvika, editor.
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| Other Form: |
Print version: Handbook of market design 9780199570515 (OCoLC)843807852 |
| ISBN |
9780191668432 (electronic book) |
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0191668435 (electronic book) |
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9780191765957 |
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0191765953 |
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1299939759 |
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9781299939752 |
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9780199570515 |
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0199570515 |
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