| Description |
1 online resource (128 pages). |
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text file |
| Series |
[Research report] ; RR-1498-A
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Research report (Rand Corporation) ; RR-1498-A.
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| Contents |
Cover ; Title Page; Copyright; Preface; Contents; Figures and Table; Summary; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; CHAPTER ONE: Introduction; CHAPTER TWO: The Annexation of Crimea; How Russia Annexed Crimea; The Balance of Forces; A Chronology of Events; Russia's Information Campaign; Characteristics of the Crimean Operation; Russian-Crimean History; Cultural Proximity Between Russia and Crimea; Geography; Russia's Force Posture and Transit Arrangements with Ukraine; Target of Opportunity; Ukrainian Actions Contributing to Russian Success; Factors Enabling Russia's Operational Successes. |
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Force CompositionMobility; Use of Deception at the Tactical and Strategic Levels; Use of Conventional Exercises as Cover; Privileging Speed, Agility, and Communications over Firepower; Preparing for Counterattack; Factors Contributing to Russia's Operational Shortcomings; Turning Local Forces; Psychological Operations; Planning for Nonviolent Resistance; Political Management of Local Elites; Information Operations; Conclusion: Implications and Effects; CHAPTER THREE: Separatism and Aggression in Eastern Ukraine (March-May 2014); How Russia Destabilized Eastern Ukraine; Chronology of Events. |
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Characteristics of the Eastern Ukraine OperationThe Ukrainian Context; The Information Campaign; The "Separatists"; The Powerful Nonstate Actors Behind Each Camp; Russia's Possible Lessons Learned; Small Investments Yield Small Benefits; Political Warfare Requires Knowing Your Target; Irregular Forces Are Difficult to Control; Nonstate Actors Matter; Former Soviet Republics Have an Ample Pool of Available Fighters; Conventional Forces Are Only a Temporary Deterrent; Political Timing Is Important; Russia's Operational Shortcomings; Russia Struggled to Control Political Warfare. |
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Russia Was Ineffective at Inspiring SeparatismPoor Assumptions Guided Moscow's Strategy; Hybrid War Was a Brief Adaptation in This Conflict; Conclusion: Implications and Effects; CHAPTER FOUR: Conclusion; APPENDIXES; A. Information Campaign; B. Timeline (February 18-May 31, 2014); References. |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 95-109). |
| Summary |
This report assesses the annexation of Crimea by Russia (February-March 2014) and the early phases of political mobilization and combat operations in Eastern Ukraine (late February-late May 2014). It examines Russia's approach, draws inferences from Moscow's intentions, and evaluates the likelihood of such methods being used again elsewhere. These two distinct campaigns overlap somewhat but offer different lessons for participants and observers. The report finds that Russia's operation to annex Crimea represented a decisive and competent use of military force in pursuit of political ends. Russia's operations in Crimea benefited from highly favorable circumstances--political, historical, geographical, and military--that limit their generalizability. Analysis of the operation underscores that there are many remaining unknowns about Russia's military capabilities, especially in the aftermath of its military reforms and modernization program. The report also finds that the campaign in Eastern Ukraine was an ineffectually implemented--and perhaps ill-conceived--effort to achieve political fragmentation of Ukraine via federalization and retain Russian influence. Russia achieved its primary objectives but at a much higher cost than desired and through a fitful cycle of adaptation. This study thus questions the desirability for Moscow to replicate a course of events similar to the campaign in Eastern Ukraine. Conversely, the operation to annex Crimea was a highly successful employment of select elements within Russia's armed forces, making it an attractive use of military power, but the structural and operation factors contributing to its success raise doubts whether it can be repeated elsewhere. |
| Local Note |
eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America |
| Subject |
Ukraine Conflict (2014-) |
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Russo-Ukrainian War, 2014-
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Russo-Ukrainian War (2014-) |
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Crimea (Ukraine) -- History, Military -- 21st century.
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Russia (Federation) -- Relations -- Ukraine.
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Russia (Federation) |
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Relations. |
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Ukraine. |
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Russia (Federation) -- History, Military -- 21st century.
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History, Military. |
| Chronological Term |
21st century |
| Subject |
Ukraine -- Relations -- Russia.
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Russia. |
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Frozen conflicts.
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Grey areas.
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Territorial disputes.
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| Chronological Term |
2000-2099 |
| Genre/Form |
Electronic books.
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Military history.
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| Added Author |
Migacheva, Katya.
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Nichiporuk, Brian, 1966-
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Radin, Andrew.
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Tkacheva.
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Oberholtzer, Jenny.
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| Other Form: |
Print version: Kofman, Michael. Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Santa Monica : RAND Corporation, ©2017 9780833096067 |
| ISBN |
9780833096173 |
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0833096176 |
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9780833096067 |
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0833096060 |
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