Skip to content
You are not logged in |Login  

LEADER 00000cam a2200925Ia 4500 
001    ocn793204146 
003    OCoLC 
005    20160527040342.3 
006    m     o  d i       
007    cr cnu---unuuu 
008    120507t20022002dcua    o    i000 0 eng d 
019    62312441|a646954075|a651935716|a815760072 
020    9781451935219|q(electronic book) 
020    1451935218|q(electronic book) 
020    |z1589060881 
020    |z9781589060883 
035    (OCoLC)793204146|z(OCoLC)62312441|z(OCoLC)646954075
       |z(OCoLC)651935716|z(OCoLC)815760072 
040    N$T|beng|epn|cN$T|dOCLCE|dUNA|dOCLCQ|dOCLCA|dCUS|dOCLCF
       |dNLGGC|dOCLCO|dCUS|dOCL|dOCLCQ|dYDXCP 
042    dlr 
043    d------ 
049    RIDW 
050  4 HC60|b.L311 2002eb 
072  7 BUS|x020000|2bisacsh 
072  7 BUS|x068000|2bisacsh 
072  7 BUS|x092000|2bisacsh 
072  7 BUS|x079000|2bisacsh 
072  7 BUS|x062000|2bisacsh 
072  7 POL|x024000|2bisacsh 
082 04 338.91|222 
084    83.44|2bcl 
090    HC60|b.L311 2002eb 
100 1  Lane, Timothy D.|q(Timothy David),|d1955-|0https://
       id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no92024193|eauthor. 
245 10 Moral hazard :|bdoes IMF financing encourage imprudence by
       borrowers and lenders? /|cTimothy Lane, Steven Phillips. 
246 30 Does IMF financing encourage imprudence by borrowers and 
       lenders? 
264  1 [Washington, D.C.] :|bInternational Monetary Fund,|c2002. 
264  4 |c©2002 
300    1 online resource (v, 15 pages) :|billustrations. 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
337    computer|bc|2rdamedia 
338    online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 
340    |gpolychrome|2rdacc 
347    text file|2rdaft 
490 1  Economic issues,|x1020-5098 ;|v28 
500    "This Economic Issue is based on IMF Working Paper WP/00/
       168, 'Does IMF financing result in moral hazard?', October
       2000"--Page iii. 
506    |3Use copy|fRestrictions unspecified|2star|5MiAaHDL 
520    "The argument that IMF financing creates moral hazard 
       cannot be lightly dismissed. From the outset, this 
       pamphlet recognizes that, to the extent IMF-supported 
       programs try to contain the total economic costs of 
       financial crises, some element of moral hazard - a greater
       willingness of creditors and debtors to take risks of such
       crises - is, in principle, an unavoidable consequence. But
       the key question, rather than a matter of presence or 
       absence, is the degree of moral hazard. The most basic 
       evidence, even in the case of countries that are supposed 
       to be too big to fail, refutes the most extreme hypothesis
       - that investors believe they have a full guarantee from 
       the IMF in the event of a financial crisis."--Preface. 
533    Electronic reproduction.|b[S.l.] :|cHathiTrust Digital 
       Library,|d2010.|5MiAaHDL 
538    Master and use copy. Digital master created according to 
       Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs
       and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, 
       December 2002.|uhttp://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
       |5MiAaHDL 
546    Available also in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, 
       Spanish. 
583 1  digitized|c2010|hHathiTrust Digital Library|lcommitted to 
       preserve|2pda|5MiAaHDL 
588 0  Print version record. 
590    eBooks on EBSCOhost|bEBSCO eBook Subscription Academic 
       Collection - North America 
610 20 International Monetary Fund|0https://id.loc.gov/
       authorities/names/n81052755|xEvaluation.|0https://
       id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh00005674 
610 24 International Monetary Fund. 
610 27 International Monetary Fund.|2fast|0https://
       id.worldcat.org/fast/556666 
650  0 Economic assistance|zDeveloping countries.|0https://
       id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2008102539 
650  0 Debts, External|zDeveloping countries.|0https://id.loc.gov
       /authorities/subjects/sh2008102078 
650  0 Loans, Foreign|zDeveloping countries.|0https://id.loc.gov/
       authorities/subjects/sh85077873 
650  0 Country risk|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/
       sh86006228|zDeveloping countries.|0https://id.loc.gov/
       authorities/subjects/sh85037341-781 
650  0 Moral hazard|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/
       sh2003006445|zDeveloping countries.|0https://id.loc.gov/
       authorities/subjects/sh85037341-781 
650  7 Evaluation.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/916975 
650  7 Economic assistance.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/
       901592 
650  7 Debts, External.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/
       888828 
650  7 Loans, Foreign.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/
       1001083 
650  7 Country risk.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/881448 
650  7 Moral hazard.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/1026090 
651  7 Developing countries.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/
       1242969 
655  4 Electronic books. 
700 1  Phillips, Steven,|d1961-|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/
       names/no93000011|eauthor. 
710 2  International Monetary Fund.|bExternal Relations 
       Department.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/
       no92020223 
710 2  International Monetary Fund,|0https://id.loc.gov/
       authorities/names/n81052755|eissuing body. 
776 08 |iPrint version:|aLane, Timothy D. (Timothy David), 1955-
       |tMoral hazard.|dWashington, D.C. : International Monetary
       Fund, 2002|z1589060881|w(DLC)  2002510926|w(OCoLC)49835125
830  0 Economic issues (International Monetary Fund) ;|0https://
       id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no96055526|v28. 
856 40 |uhttps://rider.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://
       search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&
       db=nlebk&AN=449600|zOnline eBook. Access restricted to 
       current Rider University students, faculty, and staff. 
856 42 |3Instructions for reading/downloading this eBook|uhttp://
       guides.rider.edu/ebooks/ebsco 
901    MARCIVE 20231220 
948    |d20160607|cEBSCO|tebscoebooksacademic|lridw 
994    92|bRID