| Description |
1 online resource |
| Physical Medium |
polychrome |
| Description |
text file |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| Summary |
We all form judgments about what ways of life are worthwhile, what we are morally required to do and so on. These so-called "normative" judgments have seemed puzzling in part because they exhibit both belief-like and desire-like features. Traditional cognitivist theories hold that these judgments are beliefs rather than desires; traditional non-cognitivist theories hold that they are desires rather than beliefs. Each of these traditions tries to accommodate or explain away what the_x000D_other tradition handles so easily. One often gets the sense that the defenders of these increasingly complex theories are trying to force a square peg into a round hole. So-called "hybrid theories" try to have the best of both worlds by understanding normative judgments as constituted by both_x000D_belief-like and desire-like states. |
| Local Note |
eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America |
| Subject |
Norm (Philosophy)
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Norm (Philosophy) |
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Practical judgment.
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Practical judgment. |
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Practical reason.
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Practical reason. |
| Genre/Form |
Electronic books.
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| Other Form: |
Print version: Ridge, Michael. Impassioned Belief. Oxford Scholarship Online 2014 1306477190 |
| ISBN |
9780191505126 (electronic book) |
|
0191505129 (electronic book) |
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1306477190 (electronic book) |
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9781306477192 (electronic book) |
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