| Description |
1 online resource. |
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text file |
| Series |
Human dimensions in foreign policy, military studies, and security studies ; 12
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Human dimensions in foreign policy, military studies, and security studies ; 12.
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| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| Summary |
"When the Eurpean Union signed an agreement with Turkey in 2016 to end irregular migration from Syria using extraterritorial measures, the media framed it as a radical new low in migrant protection. Similarly, when then presidential candidate Donald Trump called on Mexico to "pay for the wall," critics argued it was an outlandish departure from established norms. Extraterritorial migration control arrangements of this type have become more visible in recent years, but they are not new. Katherine Tennis traces the emergence of these agreements in the Americas, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Grounded in case studies of negotiations between the United States and Haiti and Mexico, Italy's negotiations with Tunisia and Libya, and Spain's negotiations with Senegal, Outsourcing Control argues that while some countries - sharing an interest in ensuring orderly migration or recognizing the opportunity for kickbacks - have been happy to cooperate, others have objected, claiming wealthy destination states are exploiting them to do their dirty work. Tennis shows that these different responses depend on how the government in the partner country secures its power. Autocracies and strong democracies tend to cooperate, though for different reasons and in different ways. The most unpredictable partners are fragile democracies, who are prone to nationalism and populist backlash. The first comprehensive study to trace the emergence of extraterritorial migration control agreements across nations, Outsourcing Control reveals the international and domestic pressures behind the complex, brutal, and often deadly situation facing migrants today."-- Provided by publisher. |
| Contents |
Cover -- OUTSOURCING CONTROL -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Tables and Figures -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Why Do Weak States Cooperate? A Typological Model -- 2 Where Did Extraterritorial Interdiction Agreements Come From? A Historical Comparative Perspective -- 3 Tumultuous Relations in the Caribbean: Haiti and the US -- 4 Expanding Cooperation with a Democratizing Regime: Mexico and the US -- 5 North African Strongmen and Their Successors: Tunisia and Libya Negotiate with Italy -- 6 Democratic Pragmatism in West Africa: Senegal and Spain -- 7 Conclusion |
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Appendix: Extraterritorial Interdiction Agreements between Major Destination States and Nearby Potential Partner States -- Notes -- Index |
| Local Note |
eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America |
| Subject |
Emigration and immigration -- International cooperation.
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Emigration and immigration -- International cooperation. |
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Emigration and immigration. |
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Emigration and immigration -- Political aspects.
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Emigration and immigration -- Political aspects. |
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Emigration and immigration -- Government policy.
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Emigration and immigration -- Government policy. |
| Indexed Term |
Migration, immigration & emigration |
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Political science |
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Political science & theory |
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Security (National & International) |
| Genre/Form |
Electronic books.
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Electronic books.
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| Other Form: |
Print version: Tennis, Katherine H., 1985- Outsourcing control. Montreal ; Kingston ; London ; Chicago : McGill-Queen's University Press, 2020 0228004071 9780228004073 (OCoLC)1143643604 |
| ISBN |
9780228005209 (EPUB) |
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0228005191 (PDF) |
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0228005205 (EPUB) |
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9780228005193 (electronic book) |
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