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100 1  Gale, Douglas.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/
       n82146655 
245 10 Strategic foundations of general equilibrium :|bdynamic 
       matching and bargaining games /|cDouglas Gale. 
264  1 Cambridge ;|aNew York :|bCambridge University Press,
       |c2000. 
300    1 online resource (xi, 219 pages) :|billustrations. 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
337    computer|bc|2rdamedia 
338    online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 
340    |gpolychrome|2rdacc 
347    text file|2rdaft 
490 1  Churchill lectures in economic theory 
504    Includes bibliographical references (pages 208-213) and 
       index. 
505 00 |tMarkets and games --|tStrategic foundations of perfect 
       competition --|tWhy strategic foundations? --|tCooperative
       market games --|tNon-cooperative market games --|tDynamic 
       matching and bargaining models --|tOpen questions --
       |tPerfect competition --|tPure exchange economics --
       |tDynamic matching and bargaining games --|tEquilibrium --
       |tEdgeworth Property --|tEfficiency --|tCompetitive 
       sequences of economies --|tExistence --|tEfficiency with 
       discounting --|tRandom matching --|tMixed equilibria --|tA
       summing up --|tContinuity and anonymity --|tRubinstein and
       Wolinsky (1990) --|tBounded rationality and uniqueness --
       |tLimit Principle --|tRepeated games --|tLimited memory --
       |tLarge anonymous games --|tNon-anonymous games --
       |tBounded rationality --|tImitation and experimentation --
       |tA behavioral model of competition --|tConvergence to 
       competitive prices --|tExtensions. 
520 1  "This book, written by contemporary economic theorists, 
       reports on a major research program to provide strategic 
       foundations for the theory of perfect competition." 
520 8  "Beginning with a concise survey of how the theory of 
       competition has evolved, Gale makes extensive and rigorous
       use of dynamic matching and bargaining models to provide a
       more complete description of how a competitive equilibrium
       is achieved. Whereas economists have made use of a 
       macroscopic description of markets in which certain 
       behavioral characteristics, such as price-talking behavior,
       are taken for granted, Gale uses games theory to re-
       evaluate this assumption, beginning with individual agents
       and modelling their strategic interaction. A strategic 
       foundation for competitive equilibrium shows how such 
       interaction leads to competitive, price-talking behavior."
520 8  "This book is essential reading for graduate courses in 
       game theory and general equilibrium."--Jacket. 
588 0  Print version record. 
590    eBooks on EBSCOhost|bEBSCO eBook Subscription Academic 
       Collection - North America 
650  0 Competition.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/
       sh85029337 
650  0 Equilibrium (Economics)|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/
       subjects/sh85044538 
650  0 Game theory.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/
       sh85052941 
650  7 Competition.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/871464 
650  7 Equilibrium (Economics)|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/
       fast/914547 
650  7 Game theory.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/937501 
655  4 Electronic books. 
776 08 |iPrint version:|aGale, Douglas.|tStrategic foundations of
       general equilibrium.|dCambridge ; New York : Cambridge 
       University Press, 2000|z0521643309|w(DLC)   99462249
       |w(OCoLC)43246099 
830  0 Churchill lectures in economics.|0https://id.loc.gov/
       authorities/names/n95073950 
856 40 |uhttps://rider.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://
       search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&
       db=nlebk&AN=73129|zOnline eBook. Access restricted to 
       current Rider University students, faculty, and staff. 
856 42 |3Instructions for reading/downloading this eBook|uhttp://
       guides.rider.edu/ebooks/ebsco 
901    MARCIVE 20231220 
948    |d20160615|cEBSCO|tebscoebooksacademic|lridw 
994    92|bRID