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003    OCoLC 
005    20190705070651.3 
006    m     o  d         
007    cr ||||||||||| 
008    170123s2017    nyu     ob    001 0 eng   
010      2017003117 
019    984657523|a1055368949|a1066504260|a1101719283 
020    9780231544573|q(electronic book) 
020    023154457X|q(electronic book) 
020    0231175981 
020    9780231175982 
020    |z9780231175982|q(hardcover ;|qalkaline paper) 
024 7  10.7312/milg17598|2doi 
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050  4 HF5476|b.M549 2017 
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082 00 381/.1701|223 
090    HF5476|b.M549 2017 
100 1  Milgrom, Paul R.|q(Paul Robert),|d1948-|0https://
       id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n79028779|eauthor. 
245 10 Discovering prices :|bauction design in markets with 
       complex constraints /|cPaul Milgrom. 
264  1 New York :|bColumbia University Press,|c[2017] 
300    1 online resource (xii, 232 pages). 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
337    computer|bn|2rdamedia 
338    online resource|bnc|2rdacarrier 
347    text file|bPDF|2rda 
490 1  Kenneth J. Arrow lecture series 
504    Includes bibliographical references and index. 
505 0  Introduction -- (Near- )substitutes, prices, and stability
       -- Vickrey auctions and substitution -- Deferred 
       acceptance auctions and near-substitutes -- Conclusion. 
520    Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in 
       which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no
       need for central organization. Such models build from Adam
       Smith's famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides 
       markets and renders regulation or interference largely 
       unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not 
       enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and 
       regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air 
       traffic control at major airports. While prices could 
       encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested 
       times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air 
       traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid 
       disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic 
       controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or 
       poorly used. What's needed in this and many other real-
       world cases is an auction system that can effectively 
       reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct 
       control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied. 
       In Discovering Prices, Paul Milgrom--the world's most 
       frequently cited academic expert on auction design--
       describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and 
       guide efficient resource allocations, even when resources 
       are diverse, constraints are critical, and market-clearing
       prices may not even exist. Economists have long understood
       that externalities and market power both necessitate 
       market organization. In this book, Milgrom introduces 
       complex constraints as another reason for market design. 
       Both lively and technical, Milgrom roots his new theories 
       in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. 
       incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he 
       led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for 
       dealing with the world's growing complex resource 
       allocation problems. 
546    In English. 
588 0  Print version record and CIP data provided by publisher; 
       resource not viewed. 
590    eBooks on EBSCOhost|bEBSCO eBook Subscription Academic 
       Collection - North America 
650  0 Auctions|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/
       sh85009444|xMathematical models.|0https://id.loc.gov/
       authorities/subjects/sh2002007921 
650  0 Auction theory.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/
       sh2014000152 
650  0 Prices|xMathematical models.|0https://id.loc.gov/
       authorities/subjects/sh2008109975 
650  7 Auctions|xMathematical models.|2fast|0https://
       id.worldcat.org/fast/820974 
650  7 Auctions.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/820963 
650  7 Auction theory.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/
       1909251 
650  7 Prices|xMathematical models.|2fast|0https://
       id.worldcat.org/fast/1076221 
655  0 Electronic books. 
655  4 Electronic books. 
776 08 |iPrint version:|aMilgrom, Paul R. (Paul Robert), 1948-
       |tDiscovering prices.|dNew York : Columbia University 
       Press, 2017|z9780231175982|w(DLC)  2016046839 
830  0 Kenneth J. Arrow lecture series (New York, N.Y.)|0https://
       id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2014094634 
856 40 |uhttps://rider.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://
       search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&
       db=nlebk&AN=1628763|zOnline eBook via EBSCO. Access 
       restricted to current Rider University students, faculty, 
       and staff. 
856 42 |3Instructions for reading/downloading the EBSCO version 
       of this eBook|uhttp://guides.rider.edu/ebooks/ebsco 
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