Skip to content
You are not logged in |Login  
     
Limit search to available items
Record:   Prev Next
Resources
More Information
Bestseller
BestsellerE-book

Title Delegation and agency in international organizations / edited by Darren G. Hawkins [and three others].

Publication Info. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Item Status

Description 1 online resource (xvi, 406 pages) : illustrations.
text file
Series Political economy of institutions and decisions
Political economy of institutions and decisions.
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references and index.
Contents Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal agent theory / Darren Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney -- Variation in principal preferences, structure, decision rules, and private benefits -- Who delegates? : alternative models of principals in development aid / Mona Lyne, Daniel Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney -- US domestic politics and International Monetary Fund policy / J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes -- Why multilateralism? : foreign aid and domestic principal-agent problems / Helen V. Milner -- Distribution, information, and delegation to international organizations : the case of IMF conditionality / Lisa L. Martin -- Delegation and discretion in the European Union / Mark A. Pollack -- Variation in agent preferences, legitimacy, tasks, and permeability -- How agents matter / Darren G. Hawkins and Wade Jacoby -- Screening power : international organizations as informative agents / Alexander Thompson -- Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? : staffing, voting rules, and slack in the WHO and WTO / Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson -- Delegating IMF conditionality : understanding variations in control and conformity / Erica R. Gould -- Delegation to international courts and the limits of re-contracting political power / Karen J. Alter -- Directions for future research -- Logic of delegation to international organizations / David A. Lake and Mathew D. McCubbins.
Summary Why do governments increasingly delegate sovereign authority to international organizations and what are the consequences of such choices? This volume employs a broad range of empirical techniques to answer these questions and argues that the issues involved in controlling international bureaucracies are very similar to those faced in domestic politics.
Local Note eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America
Subject International organization.
International organization.
International agencies.
International agencies.
International relations.
International relations.
Delegation of authority.
Delegation of authority.
Genre/Form Electronic books.
Added Author Hawkins, Darren G., 1966- editor.
Other Form: Print versrion: Delegation and agency in international organizations. Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2006 0521862094 (DLC) 2006023322 (OCoLC)70668756
ISBN 0511250118 (electronic book)
9780511250118 (electronic book)
9780511261039 (electronic book)
0511261039 (electronic book)
9780511250620 (electronic book)
0511250622 (electronic book)
9780511249051 (electronic book)
0511249055 (electronic book)
9786610702701
6610702705
0511249608
9780511249600
9780521862097 (hardback)
0521862094 (hardback)
9780521680462 (paperback)
0521680468 (paperback)
0511259816
9780511259814
0521680468 (Paper)
0521862094 (Cloth)