LEADER 00000cam a2200661Ii 4500 
001    on1004900794 
003    OCoLC 
005    20190111051008.5 
006    m     o  d         
007    cr ||||||||||| 
008    170929t20172017cauabo  ob    000 0 eng d 
019    1005198544 
020    9780833099167|q(pdf) 
020    0833099167|q(pdf) 
020    9780833099310 
020    0833099310 
035    (OCoLC)1004900794|z(OCoLC)1005198544 
040    DOS|beng|erda|epn|cDOS|dEBLCP|dMERUC|dOCLCF|dYDX|dN$T
       |dOCLCQ|dUMR 
049    RIDW 
050  4 UG1312.B34|bS64 2017eb online 
072  7 POL|x040020|2bisacsh 
072  7 POL|x011000|2bisacsh 
082 04 327.174|223 
090    UG1312.B34|bS64 2017eb online 
100 1  Speier, Richard,|eauthor. 
245 10 Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation :|bHindering the 
       Spread of a New Class of Weapons /|cRichard H. Speier, 
       George Nacouzi, Carrie A. Lee, Richard M. Moore. 
246 3  Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons 
264  1 Santa Monica, Calif. :|bRAND,|c[2017] 
264  4 |c©2017 
300    1 online resource (xix, 133 pages) :|bcolor illustrations,
       color maps, color photographs. 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
337    computer|bc|2rdamedia 
338    online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 
490 1  Research report ;|vRR-2137-CC 
500    "September 27, 2017"--Table of contents page. 
504    Includes bibliographical references (pages 117-133). 
505 00 |tPreface --|tFigures --|tSummary --|tAcknowledgments --
       |tAbbreviations --|g1.|tIntroduction: What This Report 
       Addresses --|g2.|tStrategic Consequences of Hypersonic 
       Missile Proliferation:|tPrincipal Characteristics of HGVs 
       --|tPrincipal Characteristics of HCMs --|tLong-Term 
       Planning Perspectives for HGV and HCM Technologies --
       |tStrategic Implications of Hypersonic Weapons --|tThe 
       Broader Picture of Increased Risk --|g3.|tOngoing 
       Hypersonic Technology Proliferation:|tCommitted 
       Governments --|tR & D in Less-Committed Countries --
       |tInternational Cooperation --|tClaimed Reasons for 
       Pursuing Hypersonic Technology --|tChallenges Posed for 
       Controlling Proliferation --|tSummary --|g4.|tHindering 
       Hypersonic Missile Proliferation:|tUnilateral Measures --
       |tMultilateral Measures --|tPotential Export Controls --
       |tIs the Missile Technology Control Regime Adaptable to 
       Hypersonic Technology? --|tRecommended Items to Control --
       |g5.|tConclusions --|gAPPENDIX A:|tThe Hypersonic Flight 
       Regime:|tIntroduction --|gAPPENDIX B:|tSurvey of Foreign 
       Hypersonic Activity:|tEuropean Union --|tAustralia --
       |tBelgium --|tBrazil --|tCanada --|tFrance --|tGermany --
       |tIndia --|tIran --|tIsrael --|tItaly --|tJapan --|tThe 
       Netherlands --|tNorway --|tPakistan --|tSingapore --
       |tSouth Korea --|tSpain --|tSweden --|tTaiwan --|tUnited 
       Kingdom --|gC.|tTechnical and Economic Barriers to 
       Hypersonic Systems Development:|tTechnical Barriers --
       |tEconomic Challenges --|tSummary of Challenges --|gD.
       |tSuggested Export Control List for Hypersonic 
       Technologies:|tStandard Additions to Export Controls --
       |tSpecific Suggestions for Export Controls --|tReferences.
520    "Hypersonic missiles--specifically hypersonic glide 
       vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles--are a new class 
       of threat because they are capable both of maneuvering and
       of flying faster than 5,000 kilometers per hour. These 
       features enable such missiles to penetrate most missile 
       defenses and to further compress the timelines for a 
       response by a nation under attack. missiles are being 
       developed by the United States, Russia, and China. Their 
       proliferation beyond these three could result in other 
       powers setting their strategic forces on hair-trigger 
       states of readiness. And such proliferation could enable 
       other powers to more credibly threaten attacks on major 
       powers. diffusion of hypersonic technology is under way in
       Europe, Japan, Australia, and India--with other nations 
       beginning to explore such technology. Proliferation could 
       cross multiple borders if hypersonic technology is offered
       on world markets. probably less than a decade available to
       substantially hinder the potential proliferation of 
       hypersonic missiles and associated technologies. To this 
       end, the report recommends that (1) the United States, 
       Russia, and China should agree not to export complete 
       hypersonic missile systems or their major components and 
       (2) the broader international community should establish 
       controls on a wider range of hypersonic missile hardware 
       and technology"--Publisher's description. 
588 0  Online resource; title from PDF title page (RAND, viewed 
       September 28, 2017). 
590    eBooks on EBSCOhost|bEBSCO eBook Subscription Academic 
       Collection - North America 
648  7 2000-2099|2fast 
650  0 Ballistic missiles. 
650  0 Ballistic missile defenses|y21st century. 
650  0 Arms control|y21st century. 
650  0 Export controls|y21st century. 
650  0 Technology transfer. 
650  0 Nuclear nonproliferation|y21st century. 
650  0 Security, International|y21st century. 
655  4 Electronic books. 
710 2  Rand Corporation.|bNational Security Research Division,
       |epublisher,|eissuing body. 
830  0 Research report (Rand Corporation) ;|vRR-2137-CC. 
856 40 |uhttps://rider.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://
       search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&
       db=nlebk&AN=1604235|zOnline eBook via EBSCO. Access 
       restricted to current Rider University students, faculty, 
       and staff. 
856 42 |3Instructions for reading/downloading the EBSCO version 
       of this eBook|uhttp://guides.rider.edu/ebooks/ebsco 
948    |d20190118|cEBSCO|tEBSCOebooksacademic NEW 1-11-19 6702 
       |lridw 
994    92|bRID