| Description |
1 online resource (xiii, 260 pages) |
| Physical Medium |
polychrome |
| Description |
text file |
| Contents |
Cover -- Title Page -- Table of Contents -- Glossary -- 1 Introduction -- 1 Introduction of the topic -- 2 Central subject of this book and limiation of scope -- 3 Overview of contents -- 4 Methodology -- 2 Efficient bankruptcy law in the U.S. and the Netherlands. Establishing an assessment framework -- 1 Bankruptcy procedure in the US -- 2 Bankruptcy procedure in the Netherlands -- 1 Why does bankruptcy law exist? -- 1.1 The common pool problem -- 1.2 The balance-sheet insolvent debtor -- 1.3 The cash-flow insolvent debtor -- 1.4 Commons and anticommons. |
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2 The (hypothetical) creditors' bargain -- 3 The creditors' bargain theory and absolute priority -- 4 The creditors' bargain theory and the new value exception -- 1 Risk sharing as a goal of bankruptcy -- 1.1 Diversification of common risks -- 1.2 Minimizing perverse incentives on the eve of bankruptcy -- 1.3 Protection of idiosyncratic value -- 1.4 Protecting non-consensual claims -- 2 Why risk sharing is not a goal of bankruptcy -- 2.1 Limited class of beneficiaries -- 2.2 Higher costs because of behavior by secured creditor -- 2.3 Higher costs because of behavior by manager-shareholder. |
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2.4 Contractual risk sharing as an alternative for mandated risk sharing -- 3 Rehabilitation and the interests of non-property right holders as a goal of bankruptcy -- 3.1 The justification for including non-economic values in the goals ofbankruptcy law: the rehabilitation view -- 3.2 The justification for including non-economic values in the goals ofbankruptcy law: feminism and communitarianism -- 3.3 The justification for including non-economic values in the goal ofbankruptcy law: the bankruptcy choice situation -- 3.3.1 Bankruptcy as a response to financial distress. |
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3.3.2 The bankruptcy choice model -- 4 The case against introducing substantive policies in bankruptcy -- 4.1 The social costs of internalization -- 4.1.1 Re-distributional objectives increase the cost of credit -- 4.1.2 The forum shopping problem -- 4.1.3 Equity reasons -- 4.2 Redistribution of wealth by other means than internalization -- 4.3 The lack of a clear and consistent value view-framework -- 5 Team production theory as an explanation for bankruptcy law -- 5.1 The team production problem -- 5.2 Team production theory. |
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5.3 Team production theory: maximizing stakeholder value and themediating hierarch -- 5.4 The team production theory in bankruptcy -- 6 Why the team production theory is inadequate -- 6.1 The primacy of shareholder value maximization -- 6.2 Team production theory does not work in bankruptcy -- 3 Shaping bankruptcy. What form shouldit take? -- 1 Bankruptcy procedure in the U.S. -- 2 Bankruptcy procedure in the Netherlands -- 1 The administrative reorganization procedure -- 1.1 The administrative reorganization procedures -- 1.2 Costs of an administrative reorganization procedure. |
| Local Note |
eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America |
| Subject |
Bankruptcy -- Netherlands.
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Bankruptcy. |
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Netherlands. |
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Bankruptcy -- United States.
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United States. |
| Genre/Form |
Electronic books.
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| Other Form: |
Print version: Hummelen, J.M. (Jochem Meike), 1985- Distress dynamics in bankruptcy 9462366292 (OCoLC)933503637 |
| ISBN |
9462744343 (electronic book) |
|
9789462744349 (electronic book) |
|
9462366292 |
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9789462366299 |
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