Skip to content
You are not logged in |Login  
     
Limit search to available items
Record 33 of 53
Record:   Prev Next
Resources
More Information
Bestseller
BestsellerE-book
Author Kelley, Judith G.

Title Monitoring democracy : when international election observation works, and why it often fails / Judith G. Kelley.

Publication Info. Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2012.

Item Status

Description 1 online resource (359 pages)
text file
Contents Cover; Contents; Illustrations; Tables; Preface; Abbreviations; PART I; CHAPTER 1: Introduction; Two Questions; Methods of Analysis; CHAPTER 2: The Rise of a New Norm; The Changing Normative Environment; Contestation; Increased Supply and Demand; The Popularization of Monitoring; Monitoring Today: Organizational Variation; Summary; CHAPTER 3: The Shadow Market; Disagreements about Contested Elections; Who Invites Whom?; Discussion; CHAPTER 4: What Influences Monitors' Assessments?; Analyzing Summary Monitor Assessments; Five Types of Bias; Discussion.
CHAPTER 5: Do Politicians Change Tactics to Evade Criticism?What Constitutes Evidence of a Monitor-Induced Shift?; What Are the Safer Forms of Cheating?; Data: The Varieties of Irregularities; The Record; Discussion; PART II; CHAPTER 6: International Monitors as Reinforcement; Altering Incentives to Cheat; Altering Domestic Conditions; If It Works, When Should It Work?; Summary; CHAPTER 7: Are Monitored Elections Better?; Measures of Election Quality; An Overview of the Record; Statistical Analysis; Discussion; CHAPTER 8: Long-Term Effects; Selection of Countries and Method of Analysis.
Do International Monitors Improve Elections Over Time?When Do Countries Follow the Recommendations of International Monitors?; Discussion; CONCLUSION: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly; Do Monitors Assess Elections Accurately and Objectively?; Do Monitors Improve the Quality of Elections?; Closing Thoughts; Appendix A: Data Description; Two Datasets; Variables; Appendix B: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 3; Appendix C: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 4; Dependent Variable; Analysis; Appendix D: Statistical Supplement to Chapter 7; Additional Description of Matching Process.
Appendix E: Case SummariesAlbania: The Importance of Leverage; Armenia: Paper Compliance; Bangladesh: Slowly but Surely?; Bulgaria: Motivated but Slow; El Salvador: International Meddling for Both Good and Bad; Georgia: Not So Rosy; Guyana: Uphill Battle; Indonesia: A Sluggish Behemoth; Kenya: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back; Lesotho: Deadlock; Mexico: Constructive Engagement; Nicaragua: Excessive Meddling and Deal Making; Panama: Both a Will and a Way; Russia: Goliath Beats David; South Africa: Remarkably Unremarkable; Notes; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P.
Qr; s; t; u; v; w; y; z.
Summary In recent decades, governments and NGOs--in an effort to promote democracy, freedom, fairness, and stability throughout the world--have organized teams of observers to monitor elections in a variety of countries. But when more organizations join the practice without uniform standards, are assessments reliable? When politicians nonetheless cheat and monitors must return to countries even after two decades of engagement, what is accomplished? Monitoring Democracy argues that the practice of international election monitoring is broken, but still worth fixing. By analyzing the evolving interaction.
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references and index.
Local Note eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America
Subject Election monitoring.
Election monitoring.
Election monitoring -- Case studies.
Genre/Form Case studies.
Electronic books.
Electronic books -- Case studies.
Electronic books -- Case studies.
Case studies.
Other Form: Print version: Kelley, Judith G. Monitoring Democracy : When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails. Princeton : Princeton University Press, ©2012 9780691152783
ISBN 9781400842520 (electronic book)
1400842522 (electronic book)
9780691152776
0691152772
9780691152783
0691152780