This book focuses on some new issues associated with British appeasement policy in the 1930s. It looks particularly at how the artificial split between international history and military history has led to the over-simplification of the factors involved in formulating the appeasement policy. It argues that, contrary to anti-appeasement mythology, Britain was not left defenceless in 1939, having in fact a highly sophisticated aerial defence system for which Baldwin and Chamberlain have received little credit. Conversely, the disaster of 1940 was not a consequence of the sins of the British appea.
Contents
Armistice -- The Birth of Appeasement -- Hitler Comes to Power -- Four Appeasers -- Italy and Japan -- Three Crises -- Munich -- The Armed Forces -- The Foreign Office -- Poland -- The Coming of War -- Conclusion.
Local Note
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