| Edition |
First edition. |
| Description |
1 online resource (vii, 219 pages) |
| Physical Medium |
polychrome |
| Description |
text file |
| Contents |
Defending a source view -- Problems for event-causal and non-causal libertarianisms -- The prospects for agent-causal libertarianism -- A manipulation argument against compatibilism -- Free will skepticism and rational deliberation -- Moral responsibility without basic desert -- Free will skepticism and criminal behavior -- Personal relationships and meaning in life. |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 200-214) and indexes. |
| Summary |
Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original, forward-looking conception of moral responsibility. He argues that although we may not possess the kind of free will that is normally considered necessary for moral responsibility, this does not jeopardize our sense of ourselves as agents, or a robust sense of achievement and meaning in life. |
| Local Note |
eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America |
| Subject |
Free will and determinism.
|
|
Free will and determinism. |
|
Life.
|
|
Life. |
| Genre/Form |
Electronic books.
|
| Other Form: |
Print version: Pereboom, Derk. Free will, agency, and meaning in life 0199685517 (DLC) 2013943741 (OCoLC)878817225 |
| ISBN |
9780191508721 (electronic book) |
|
0191508721 (electronic book) |
|
9781306426343 |
|
1306426340 |
|
9780191765674 |
|
0191765678 |
|
0199685517 |
|
9780199685516 |
|
