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001 ocn723148923
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005 20160527040630.2
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008 110513s2011 dcu ob 000 0 eng d
019 923283327
020 9780309208857|q(electronic book)
020 0309208858|q(electronic book)
020 |z9780309208840
020 |z030920884X
035 (OCoLC)723148923|z(OCoLC)923283327
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050 4 U264.3|b.U53 2011eb
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072 7 HIS|x027130|2bisacsh
082 04 355.8/25119/0973|222
090 U264.3|b.U53 2011eb
110 2 National Research Council (U.S.).|bCommittee on Risk-Based
Approaches for Securing the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex.
|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2011077839
245 10 Understanding and managing risk in security systems for
the DOE nuclear weapons complex :|babbreviated version /
|cCommittee on Risk-Based Approaches for Securing the DOE
Nuclear Weapons Complex, Nuclear and Radiation Studies
Board, Division on Earth and Life Studies, National
Research Council of the National Academies.
264 1 Washington, D.C. :|bNational Academies Press,|c2011.
300 1 online resource (xv, 13 pages)
336 text|btxt|2rdacontent
337 computer|bc|2rdamedia
338 online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
340 |gpolychrome|2rdacc
347 text file|2rdaft
500 "This is an abbreviated version of the National Academies'
report on augmenting DOE's security systems at sites in
the nuclear weapons complex, and particularly on the
applicability of risk assessment concepts for this
augmentation. The full report is entitled Understanding
and managing risk in the DOE nuclear weapons complex. The
full version of that report, which is exempt from public
release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5
U.S.C. [section] 552 (b)(2), was issued in 2010.
504 Includes bibliographical references (page 6).
505 0 ""Frontmatter ""; ""Preface to the Abbreviated Version"";
""Preface""; ""Acknowledgments""; ""Reviewers"";
""Contents""; ""Executive Summary""; ""Summary"";
""References""; ""Biographical Sketches of Committee
Members""; ""Appendix A: Statement of Task""; ""Appendix B
: Acronyms""
520 A nuclear weapon or a significant quantity of special
nuclear material (SNM) would be of great value to a
terrorist or other adversary. It might have particular
value if acquired from a U.S. facility--in addition to
acquiring a highly destructive tool, the adversary would
demonstrate an inability of the United States to protect
its nuclear assets. The United States expends considerable
resources toward maintaining effective security at
facilities that house its nuclear assets. However,
particularly in a budget-constrained environment, it is
essential that these assets are also secured efficiently,
meaning at reasonable cost and imposing minimal burdens on
the primary missions of the organizations that operate
U.S. nuclear facilities. It is in this context that the
U.S. Congress directed the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA)--a semi-autonomous agency in the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) responsible for securing
nuclear weapons and significant quantities of SNM--asked
the National Academies for advice on augmenting its
security approach, particularly on the applicability of
quantitative and other risk-based approaches for securing
its facilities. In carrying out its charge, the committee
has focused on what actions NNSA could take to make its
security approach more effective and efficient. The
committee concluded that the solution to balancing cost,
security, and operations at facilities in the nuclear
weapons complex is not to assess security risks more
quantitatively or more precisely. This is primarily
because there is no comprehensive analytical basis for
defining the attack strategies that a malicious, creative,
and deliberate adversary might employ or the probabilities
associated with them. However, using structured thinking
processes and techniques to characterize security risk
could improve NNSA's understanding of security
vulnerabilities and guide more effective resource
allocation.
588 0 Print version record.
590 eBooks on EBSCOhost|bEBSCO eBook Subscription Academic
Collection - North America
610 14 United States.|bNational Nuclear Security Administration
|xEvaluation.
650 0 Nuclear weapons plants|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/
subjects/sh89000363|xSecurity measures|0https://id.loc.gov
/authorities/subjects/sh99005297|zUnited States.|0https://
id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n78095330-781
650 0 Nuclear weapons industry|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/
subjects/sh85093133|xRisk management|0https://id.loc.gov/
authorities/subjects/sh2004006348|zUnited States.|0https:/
/id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n78095330-781
650 7 Nuclear weapons plants|xSecurity measures.|2fast|0https://
id.worldcat.org/fast/1041049
650 7 Nuclear weapons plants.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/
fast/1041037
650 7 Nuclear weapons industry.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/
fast/1041023
650 7 Risk management.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/
1098164
651 7 United States.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/1204155
655 4 Electronic books.
776 08 |iPrint version:|aNational Research Council (U.S.).
Committee on Risk-Based Approaches for Securing the DOE
Nuclear Weapons Complex.|tUnderstanding and managing risk
in security systems for the DOE nuclear weapons complex
(abbreviated version).|dWashington, D.C. : National
Academies Presss, ©2011|z9780309208840|w(OCoLC)725437054
856 40 |uhttps://rider.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://
search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&
db=nlebk&AN=364654|zOnline eBook. Access restricted to
current Rider University students, faculty, and staff.
856 42 |3Instructions for reading/downloading this eBook|uhttp://
guides.rider.edu/ebooks/ebsco
901 MARCIVE 20231220
948 |d20160616|cEBSCO|tebscoebooksacademic|lridw
994 92|bRID
