LEADER 00000cam a2200649Ia 4500 001 ocn723148923 003 OCoLC 005 20160527040630.2 006 m o d 007 cr cnu---unuuu 008 110513s2011 dcu ob 000 0 eng d 019 923283327 020 9780309208857|q(electronic book) 020 0309208858|q(electronic book) 020 |z9780309208840 020 |z030920884X 035 (OCoLC)723148923|z(OCoLC)923283327 040 N$T|beng|epn|cN$T|dCOF|dVRC|dE7B|dNATAP|dOCLCQ|dWVH|dOCLCQ |dDKDLA|dOCLCQ|dYDXCP|dOCLCQ|dEBLCP 043 n-us--- 049 RIDW 050 4 U264.3|b.U53 2011eb 072 7 TEC|x025000|2bisacsh 072 7 HIS|x027130|2bisacsh 082 04 355.8/25119/0973|222 090 U264.3|b.U53 2011eb 110 2 National Research Council (U.S.).|bCommittee on Risk-Based Approaches for Securing the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex. |0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2011077839 245 10 Understanding and managing risk in security systems for the DOE nuclear weapons complex :|babbreviated version / |cCommittee on Risk-Based Approaches for Securing the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex, Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board, Division on Earth and Life Studies, National Research Council of the National Academies. 264 1 Washington, D.C. :|bNational Academies Press,|c2011. 300 1 online resource (xv, 13 pages) 336 text|btxt|2rdacontent 337 computer|bc|2rdamedia 338 online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 340 |gpolychrome|2rdacc 347 text file|2rdaft 500 "This is an abbreviated version of the National Academies' report on augmenting DOE's security systems at sites in the nuclear weapons complex, and particularly on the applicability of risk assessment concepts for this augmentation. The full report is entitled Understanding and managing risk in the DOE nuclear weapons complex. The full version of that report, which is exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. [section] 552 (b)(2), was issued in 2010. 504 Includes bibliographical references (page 6). 505 0 ""Frontmatter ""; ""Preface to the Abbreviated Version""; ""Preface""; ""Acknowledgments""; ""Reviewers""; ""Contents""; ""Executive Summary""; ""Summary""; ""References""; ""Biographical Sketches of Committee Members""; ""Appendix A: Statement of Task""; ""Appendix B : Acronyms"" 520 A nuclear weapon or a significant quantity of special nuclear material (SNM) would be of great value to a terrorist or other adversary. It might have particular value if acquired from a U.S. facility--in addition to acquiring a highly destructive tool, the adversary would demonstrate an inability of the United States to protect its nuclear assets. The United States expends considerable resources toward maintaining effective security at facilities that house its nuclear assets. However, particularly in a budget-constrained environment, it is essential that these assets are also secured efficiently, meaning at reasonable cost and imposing minimal burdens on the primary missions of the organizations that operate U.S. nuclear facilities. It is in this context that the U.S. Congress directed the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)--a semi-autonomous agency in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) responsible for securing nuclear weapons and significant quantities of SNM--asked the National Academies for advice on augmenting its security approach, particularly on the applicability of quantitative and other risk-based approaches for securing its facilities. In carrying out its charge, the committee has focused on what actions NNSA could take to make its security approach more effective and efficient. The committee concluded that the solution to balancing cost, security, and operations at facilities in the nuclear weapons complex is not to assess security risks more quantitatively or more precisely. This is primarily because there is no comprehensive analytical basis for defining the attack strategies that a malicious, creative, and deliberate adversary might employ or the probabilities associated with them. However, using structured thinking processes and techniques to characterize security risk could improve NNSA's understanding of security vulnerabilities and guide more effective resource allocation. 588 0 Print version record. 590 eBooks on EBSCOhost|bEBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America 610 14 United States.|bNational Nuclear Security Administration |xEvaluation. 650 0 Nuclear weapons plants|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/ subjects/sh89000363|xSecurity measures|0https://id.loc.gov /authorities/subjects/sh99005297|zUnited States.|0https:// id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n78095330-781 650 0 Nuclear weapons industry|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/ subjects/sh85093133|xRisk management|0https://id.loc.gov/ authorities/subjects/sh2004006348|zUnited States.|0https:/ /id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n78095330-781 650 7 Nuclear weapons plants|xSecurity measures.|2fast|0https:// id.worldcat.org/fast/1041049 650 7 Nuclear weapons plants.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/ fast/1041037 650 7 Nuclear weapons industry.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/ fast/1041023 650 7 Risk management.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/ 1098164 651 7 United States.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/1204155 655 4 Electronic books. 776 08 |iPrint version:|aNational Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Risk-Based Approaches for Securing the DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex.|tUnderstanding and managing risk in security systems for the DOE nuclear weapons complex (abbreviated version).|dWashington, D.C. : National Academies Presss, ©2011|z9780309208840|w(OCoLC)725437054 856 40 |uhttps://rider.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http:// search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site& db=nlebk&AN=364654|zOnline eBook. Access restricted to current Rider University students, faculty, and staff. 856 42 |3Instructions for reading/downloading this eBook|uhttp:// guides.rider.edu/ebooks/ebsco 901 MARCIVE 20231220 948 |d20160616|cEBSCO|tebscoebooksacademic|lridw 994 92|bRID