LEADER 00000cam a2200457Ii 4500 
001    ocn913853282 
003    OCoLC 
005    20160328104216.0 
008    150715t20152015nyu      b    001 0 eng d 
010      2015938776 
019    910535598 
020    9780198746782|q(hardback) 
020    0198746784|q(hardback) 
040    ERASA|beng|erda|cERASA|dBDX|dBTCTA|dCDX|dYDXCP|dYNK|dNLE
       |dOCLCO|dOCLCF|dCLU|dAUM|dGZN|dOLC|dEYR|dTKN|dUBY|dWCH 
049    WCHA 
090    N70|b.K58 2015 
100 1  Kivy, Peter,|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/
       n50047220|eauthor. 
245 10 De gustibus :|barguing about taste and why we do it /
       |cPeter Kivy. 
250    First edition. 
264  1 New York, NY :|bOxford University Press|c2015. 
264  4 |c©2015 
300    xii, 173 pages ;|c23 cm 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
337    unmediated|bn|2rdamedia 
338    volume|bnc|2rdacarrier 
504    Includes bibliographical references and index. 
505 0  Hume's Dilemma -- A Ground Common to All -- The Beautiful 
       Versus the Good (in the Eighteenth Century) -- Simple 
       Emotivism -- Do So as Well -- The Aesthetic Shrug -- 
       Immoral Art -- Is Bad Taste Immoral? -- Push-Pin and 
       Poetry -- Back to Square One -- The Right Phenomenology? -
       - The Truth of Interpretation -- The Truth of Analysis -- 
       The Truth of Evaluation -- Common Sense and the Error 
       Theory. 
520 8  In 'De Gustibus' Peter Kivy deals with a question that has
       never been fully addressed by philosophers of art: why do 
       we argue about art? We argue about the 'facts' of the 
       world either to influence people's behaviour or simply to 
       get them to see what we take to be the truth about the 
       world. We argue over ethical matters, if we are ethical 
       'realists,' because we think we are arguing about 'facts' 
       in the world. And we argue about ethics, if we are 
       'emotivists,' or are now what are called 'expressionists,'
       which is to say, people who think matters of ethics are 
       simply matters of 'attitude,' to influence the behaviour 
       of others. But why should we argue about works of art? 
       There are no 'actions' we wish to motivate. Whether I 
       think Bach is greater than Beethoven and you think the 
       opposite, why should it matter to either of us to convince
       the other? This is a question that philosophers have never
       faced. Kivy claims here that we argue over taste because 
       we think, mistakenly or not, that we are arguing over 
       matters of fact. 
546    English text. 
650  0 Art|xPhilosophy.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/
       sh85007494 
650  0 Aesthetics.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/
       sh85001441 
650  0 Arts|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85008324
       |xPhilosophy and aesthetics.|0https://id.loc.gov/
       authorities/subjects/sh2014002232 
650  7 Art|xPhilosophy.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/
       815307 
650  7 Aesthetics.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/798702 
650  7 Arts.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/817721 
901    MARCIVE 20231220 
948    |d20160930|clti|tlti-aex 
994    C0|bWCH