| Description |
1 online resource (xiv, 199 pages) : illustrations, maps |
|
text file |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| Contents |
Introduction: Preventing Coups d'état -- The Logic of Counterbalancing -- Counterbalancing and Coup Failure -- How Counterbalancing Works: Testing the Causal Mechanisms -- An Effective Deterrent? Counterbalancing and Coup Attempts -- Challenges to Building Coercive Institutions -- How Coups d'état Escalate to Civil War -- Conclusion: Coercive Institutions and Regime Survival. |
| Summary |
"In this book Erica De Bruin shows that how rulers design and organize their coercive institutions affects the survival of their regimes. Balancing the military with republican guards, secret police, and militia makes attempts to oust rulers more likely to fail. However, counterbalancing carries risks. When forces outside the regular military chain of command compete for arms and recruits, resentment among military officers can provoke coup attempts even as counterbalancing creates obstacles to a coup's execution."-- Provided by publisher. |
| Local Note |
eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America |
| Subject |
Coups d'état -- Prevention.
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Coups d'état. |
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Civil war -- Prevention.
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Civil war. |
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Balance of power.
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Balance of power. |
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Political leadership.
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Political leadership. |
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Political stability.
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Political stability. |
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Military policy.
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Military policy. |
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Civil-military relations.
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Civil-military relations. |
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National security.
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National security. |
| Genre/Form |
Electronic books.
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Electronic books.
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| Other Form: |
Print version: De Bruin, Erica, 1982- How to prevent coups d'état Ithaca [New York] : Cornell University Press, 2020 9781501751912 (DLC) 2020005767 |
| ISBN |
9781501751929 electronic book |
|
150175193X electronic book |
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9781501751936 electronic book |
|
1501751921 electronic book |
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9781501751912 hardcover |
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