| Description |
1 online resource (xiv, 319 pages) : illustrations |
| Physical Medium |
polychrome |
| Description |
text file |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 297-310) and index. |
| Contents |
1. Introduction and overview of security games / Milind Tambe and Maish Jain -- Part I. Security Experts' Perspective: 2. LAX: terror target: the history, the reason, the countermeasure / Erroll Southers; 3. Maritime transportation system security and the use of game theory: a perfect match to address operational and tactical concerns / Joe DiRenzo III, Ben Maule, Erik Jensen and Fred Bertsch IV -- Part II. Deployed Applications: g4. Deployed ARMOR protection: the application of a game theoretic model for security at the Los Angeles International Airport / James Pita [and others]; 5. IRIS: a tool for strategic security allocation in transportation networks / Jason Tsai [and others]; 6. GUARDS: game theoretic security allocation on a national scale / James Pita [and others] -- Part III. Efficient Algorithms for Massive Security Games: 7. Coordinating randomized policies for increasing security of agent systems / Praveen Paruchuri [and others]; 8. Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games / Christopher Kiekintveld [and others]; 9. Security games with arbitrary schedules: a branch-and-price approach / Manish Jain [and others] -- Part IV. Future Research: 10. Effective solutions for real-world Stackelberg games: when agents must deal with human uncertainties / James Pita; 11. Approximation methods for infinite Bayesian Stackelberg games: modeling distributional payoff uncertainty / Christopher Kiekintveld, Janusz Marecki and Milind Tambe; 12. Stackelberg versus Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness / Zhengyu Yin [and others]; 13. Evaluating deployed decision-support systems for security: challenges, arguments, and approaches / Matthew E. Taylor, Christopher Kiekintveld and Milind Tambe. |
| Summary |
"Global threats of terrorism, drug-smuggling and other crimes have led to a significant increase in research on game theory for security. Game theory provides a sound mathematical approach to deploy limited security resources to maximize their effectiveness. A typical approach is to randomize security schedules to avoid predictability, with the randomization using artificial intelligence techniques to take into account the importance of different targets and potential adversary reactions. This book distills the forefront of this research to provide the first and only study of long-term deployed applications of game theory for security for key organizations such as the Los Angeles International Airport police and the US Federal Air Marshals Service. The author and his research group draw from their extensive experience working with security officials to intelligently allocate limited security resources to protect targets, outlining the applications of these algorithms in research and the real world"-- Provided by publisher. |
| Local Note |
eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America |
| Subject |
Computer security.
|
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Computer security. |
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Game theory.
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Game theory. |
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Security, International -- Mathematical models.
|
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Security, International -- Mathematical models. |
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Security, International. |
| Genre/Form |
Electronic books.
|
| Other Form: |
Print version: Tambe, Milind, 1965- Security and game theory. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2012 9781107096424 (DLC) 2011038733 (OCoLC)751798356 |
| ISBN |
9781139206600 (electronic book) |
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1139206605 (electronic book) |
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9780511973031 (electronic book) |
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0511973039 (electronic book) |
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9781139205023 (electronic book) |
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1139205021 (electronic book) |
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9781107096424 |
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1107096421 |
|
