| Description |
1 online resource (xvi, 272 pages) |
|
data file |
| Physical Medium |
polychrome |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| Contents |
Why comparative constitutional law? -- Alternative forms of judicial review -- The possible instability of weak-form review and its implications -- Why and how to evaluate consitutional performance -- Constitutional decision making outside the courts -- The state action doctrine and social and economic rights -- Structures of judicial review, horizontal effect, and social welfare rights -- Enforcing social and economic rights. |
| Summary |
Unlike many other countries, the United States has few constitutional guarantees of social welfare rights such as income, housing, or healthcare. In part this is because many Americans believe that the courts cannot possibly enforce such guarantees. However, recent innovations in constitutional design in other countries suggest that such rights can be judicially enforced--not by increasing the power of the courts but by decreasing it. In Weak Courts, Strong Rights, Mark Tushnet uses a comparative legal perspective to show how creating weaker forms of judicial review may actually allow for stro. |
| Local Note |
eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America |
| Subject |
Judicial review -- United States.
|
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Judicial review. |
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United States. |
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Social rights -- United States.
|
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Social rights. |
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Judicial review.
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Social rights.
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| Genre/Form |
Electronic books.
|
| Added Title |
Judicial review and social welfare rights in comparative constitutional law |
| Other Form: |
Print version: Tushnet, Mark V., 1945- Weak courts, strong rights. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, ©2008 9780691130927 0691130922 (DLC) 2007003095 (OCoLC)80460670 |
| ISBN |
9781400828159 (electronic book) |
|
1400828155 (electronic book) |
|
1282086952 |
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9781282086951 |
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9780691130927 |
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0691130922 |
|
