LEADER 00000cam a2200685Mi 4500 001 on1049627104 003 OCoLC 005 20200110051353.8 006 m o d 007 cr ||||||||||| 008 180821t20182018gw fob z001 0 eng d 019 1048944897|a1049858992 020 9783110599855|q(electronic book) 020 3110599856|q(electronic book) 020 9783110599787|q(electronic book) 020 3110599783|q(electronic book) 020 |z9783110599251 020 |z3110599252 020 |z3110600722 020 |z9783110600728 024 7 10.1515/9783110599787|2doi 035 (OCoLC)1049627104|z(OCoLC)1048944897|z(OCoLC)1049858992 040 DEGRU|beng|erda|epn|cDEGRU|dYDX|dN$T|dEBLCP|dOCLCF|dYDX |dOCLCQ|dUKAHL|dOCLCQ 049 RIDW 050 4 BJ1012|b.F57 2018 072 7 PHI005000|2bisacsh 072 7 PHI016000|2bisacsh 072 7 PHI|x009000|2bisacsh 072 7 PHI|x016000|2bisacsh 082 04 170|223 090 BJ1012|b.F57 2018 100 1 Fischer, Stefan|c(Writer on philosophy),|0https:// id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2019111742|eauthor. 245 14 The Origin of Oughtness :|ba Case for Metaethical Conativism /|cStefan Fischer. 264 1 Berlin ;|aBoston :|bDe Gruyter,|c[2018] 264 4 |c©2018 300 1 online resource (297 pages). 336 text|btxt|2rdacontent 337 computer|bc|2rdamedia 338 online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 347 text file|bPDF|2rda 490 1 Practical Philosophy ;|vvolume 22 504 Includes bibliographical references and index. 505 00 |tFrontmatter --|tPreface and acknowledgments --|tContents --|tPart i: the phenomenon and how to explain it --|t1 the phenomenon of oughtness --|t2 the grounds for explaining oughtness --|t3 two angles and a dialectical dead end -- |tPart ii: four theories of oughtness --|t4 stemmer's humean theory of oughtness --|t5 halbig's value realism -- |t6 schroeder's hypotheticalism --|t7 scanlon's reasons fundamentalism --|t8 why humeanism 'wins' --|tPart iii: constructing conativism --|t9 a look ahead --|t10 an anthropological framework for humeanism --|t11 the argument from favored desires --|t12 the nature of desiring --|t13 promoting desires --|t14 idealization, epistemic error, and autonomy --|t15 the nature of practical reasons --|t16 the weight of favorings --|t17 conativism and the morality angle --|t18 the origin of oughtness: a recapitulation --|tBibliography --|tIndex. 520 How come we ought to do things? Current metanormative debates often suffer from the fact that authors implicitly use adequacy conditions not shared by their opponents. This leads to an unsatisfying dialectical gridlock (Chang) : One author accuses her opponents of not being able to account for stuff she judges essential, but the opponents do not think this to be a major flaw. In an attempt to meet the problem of gridlock head-on, the current investigation approaches oughtness differently. I start with the introduction of a grounding framework for thinking about oughtness that allows a lucid presentation of the views on the market. It soon becomes clear that one necessary part of any plausible assessment of accounts of oughtness is a discussion of their adequacy conditions. I continue with a detailed evaluation of four different accounts, as presented by Halbig (2007), Schroeder (2007), Stemmer (2006), and Scanlon (2014). My main result is that desire-based or Humean theories of oughtness are more plausible because desire-independent accounts fail to explain something crucial: the for-me character of oughtness. Based on the insights gathered thus far, I then develop a new Humean theory - metaethical conativism - and defend it against some historically influential objections. 546 In English. 588 0 Online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 21. Aug 2018). 590 eBooks on EBSCOhost|bEBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America 650 0 Metaethics.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/ sh2011005653 650 7 Metaethics.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/1894559 655 4 Electronic books. 776 08 |iPrint version:|z9783110599251 776 08 |iPrint version:|z9783110600728 830 0 Practical philosophy ;|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/ names/no2004056085|vvolume 22. 856 40 |uhttps://rider.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http:// search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site& db=nlebk&AN=1868109|zOnline eBook via EBSCO. Access restricted to current Rider University students, faculty, and staff. 856 42 |3Instructions for reading/downloading the EBSCO version of this eBook|uhttp://guides.rider.edu/ebooks/ebsco 901 MARCIVE 20231220 948 |d20200122|cEBSCO|tEBSCOebooksacademic NEW 12-21,1-17 11948|lridw 994 92|bRID