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019 851972155|a857426646
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090 BJ1012|b.M49 2013eb
100 1 Meylan, Anne.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/
no2013128919
245 10 Foundations of an ethics of belief /|cAnne Meylan.
264 1 Frankfurt :|bOntos Verlag,|c[2013]
264 4 |c©2013
300 1 online resource (218 pages).
336 text|btxt|2rdacontent
337 computer|bc|2rdamedia
338 online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier
340 |gpolychrome|2rdacc
347 text file|2rdaft
490 1 Practical philosophy ;|vv. 15
504 Includes bibliographical references.
505 0 TABLE OF CONTENTS; INTRODUCTION; The initial intuition;
Main objective; Preliminary clarificatory remarks; Two
central problems; The problem of control and
responsibility; The normative problem; Abstracts of the
chapters; Chapter 1: What the philosophy of action teaches
us; Chapter 2: The impossibility of acquiring beliefs
directly for reasons; Chapter 3: Pascalian and theoretical
control; Chapter 4: Doxastic responsibility as
responsibility for consequences; Chapter 5: Epistemic
praiseworthiness and epistemic blameworthiness; Chapter 6:
Beyond epistemic justifiedness.
505 8 Chapter 7: Epistemic justifiedness and non-epistemic
justifiednessChapter 1: What the philosophy of action
teaches us; Actions and happenings; Non-reductionist
conception of action; Reductionist conception of action;
Actions, happenings and activities; Acting for reasons;
Three distinctions about reasons; Motivating reasons vs.
normative reasons; Internalism vs. externalism about
reasons; Humean vs. anti-Humean conception of motivation;
Back to the doxastic realm; Epistemic reasons, non-
epistemic reasons and evidence; Delineating the
interesting issue.
505 8 Chapter 2: The Impossibility of directly acquiring beliefs
for reasonsDirect and indirect belief acquisitions; Direct
/indirect acquisitions of belief and epistemic/non-
epistemic reasons; Williams' argument; "To believe that p
is to believe that p is true"; Believing vs. imagining;
Transparency; The teleological account; Conclusions;
Chapter 3: Theoretical and Pascalian control; Two forms of
indirect doxastic control; Theoretical control; Pascalian
control; Indirect doxastic influence on belief
acquisitions; Unlimited doxastic control considered;
Ryan's unlimited doxastic control.
505 8 Pieces of evidence vs. motivating reasonsSteup's unlimited
doxastic control; Chapter 4: Doxastic Responsibility as
Responsibility for Consequences; Responsibility for
consequences; Responsibility for basic actions;
Responsibility for the consequences of actions;
Responsibility for resultant belief acquisitions,
theoretical and Pascalian control; Responsibility for
resultant belief acquisitions and indirect doxastic
influence; Responsibility for believing; Chapter 5:
Epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthiness; Epistemic
and non-epistemic desirability; The fundamental epistemic
end.
505 8 Other epistemically desirable statesThe fundamental
epistemic end: some specifications; Epistemic and non-
epistemic ends: summary; Varieties of epistemic goodness*;
Final and instrumental epistemic goodness; Epistemic
rationality and epistemic commendability; Varieties of
epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthiness; Final and
instrumental epistemic praiseworthiness and
blameworthiness; Epistemic praiseworthiness/
blameworthiness for rational belief acquisitions.
520 In the course of our daily lives we make lots of
evaluations of actions. We think that driving above the
speed limit is dangerous, that giving up one's bus seat to
the elderly is polite, that stirring eggs with a plastic
spoon is neither good nor bad. We understand too that we
may be praised or blamed for actions performed on the
basis of these evaluations. The same is true in the case
of certain beliefs. Sometimes we blame people for what
they believe falsely or irrationally. On occasion, we
praise them for their intellectual discoveries. The goal
of the present study is to describe the found.
590 eBooks on EBSCOhost|bEBSCO eBook Subscription Academic
Collection - North America
650 0 Ethics.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/
sh85045096
650 0 Social ethics.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/
sh85123939
650 7 Ethics.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/915833
650 7 Social ethics.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/1122447
655 4 Electronic books.
776 08 |iPrint version:|aMeylan, Anne.|tFoundations of an Ethics
of Belief.|dBerlin : De Gruyter, ©2013|z9783110327441
830 0 Practical philosophy ;|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/
names/no2004056085|vBd. 15.
856 40 |uhttps://rider.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://
search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&
db=nlebk&AN=603716|zOnline eBook. Access restricted to
current Rider University students, faculty, and staff.
856 42 |3Instructions for reading/downloading this eBook|uhttp://
guides.rider.edu/ebooks/ebsco
901 MARCIVE 20231220
948 |d20160607|cEBSCO|tebscoebooksacademic|lridw
994 92|bRID
