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Author Pirnie, Bruce, 1940-

Title Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006) / Bruce R. Pirnie, Edward O'Connell.

Imprint Santa Monica, CA : Rand, 2008.

Item Status

Description 1 online resource (xxvii, 106 pages) : color illustrations.
Physical Medium polychrome.
Description data file
Series Rand counterinsurgency study ; v. 2
Rand counterinsurgency study. Paper ; 2.
Note "RAND National Defense Research Institute."
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references (pages 99-106).
Contents Ch. 1: Overview of the conflict in Iraq -- ch. 2: Armed groups in Iraq -- ch. 3: Counterinsurgency in Iraq -- ch. 4: Accounting for success and failure -- ch. 5: Building effective capabilities for counterinsurgency -- ch. 6: Recommendations.
Summary -- Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Overview of the conflict in Iraq -- Ba'athist regime -- Invasion of Iraq -- Occupation of Iraq -- First priority : setting up a constitutional government -- Spring -- The spiral downward begins (Spring 2004) -- Benchmark one : holding Iraqi elections -- Islamic extremists and sectarian violence -- A U.S. approach hesitantly unfold -- Armed groups in Iraq -- Overview -- Kurdish separatists -- Sunni Arab insurgents -- Violent extremists -- Shi'ite Arab militias -- Criminal gangs -- Insurgent use of terrorism -- Counterinsurgency in Iraq -- Organization and recognition of the U.S. COIN effort is slow to unfold -- Traditional U.S. military forces may need to be adjusted -- Fallujah -- Tal Afar -- Baghdad -- Air support -- Combatting improvised explosive devices -- Detainee operations -- U.S. development and support of Iraqi forces -- Iraqi police -- Iraqi armed forces -- Assessing progress in counterinsurgency -- Iraqi casualties and displacement -- Iraqi economy -- Iraqi opinion -- Accounting for success and failure -- Understanding Iraqi society -- Little planning for the occupation of Iraq -- The impact of a lack od international support for the war -- The disastrous effects of prematurely dismantling the Ba'athist regime -- The challenge of building a new Iraqi state from scratch -- Instituting a new system of justice -- Undertaking the reconstruction of Iraq -- The consequences of failing to maintain security early on military missions -- Lck of infiltration and tips hinder intelligence on the insurgency -- Building effective capabilities for counterinsurgency -- Use of force -- Public safety and security -- Partnering with and enabling indigenous forces -- Reporting on the enemy and infiltration -- Provision of essential services -- Informing and influencing operations -- Rigorous and coordinated detainee operations -- Recommendations -- Development of strategy -- Coalition-building -- Planning process -- Unity of effort -- Interagency process -- Host-nation governance -- Funding mechanisms -- Counterinsurgency as a mission -- Protection of the indigenous population -- Personnel policy -- U.S. Army special forces -- Partnership with indigenous forces -- Policing functions -- Brigade organization -- Gunship-like capability -- Intelligence collection and sharing.
Summary This monograph outlines strategic considerations relative to counterinsurgency campaigns; presents an overview of the current conflict in Iraq, focusing on counterinsurgency; analyzes counterinsurgency operations in Iraq; presents conclusions about counterinsurgency, based on the U.S. experience in Iraq; describes implications from that experience for future counterinsurgency operations; and offers recommendations to improve the ability of the U.S. government to conduct counterinsurgency in the future. For example, U.S. counterinsurgency experience in Iraq has revealed the need to achieve synergy and balance among several simultaneous civilian and military efforts and the need to continually address and reassess the right indicators to determine whether current strategies are adequate. The need to continually reassess counterinsurgency strategy and tactics implies that military and civilian leaders must have not only the will, but also a formal mechanism, to fearlessly and thoroughly call to the attention of senior decisionmakers any shortfalls in policies and practices, e.g., in Iraq, failure to protect the civilian population, as well as overreliance on technological approaches to counterinsurgency. The Iraq experience is particularly germane to drawing lessons about counterinsurgency. In essence, the conflict there is a local political power struggle overlaid with sectarian violence and fueled by fanatical foreign jihadists and criminal opportunists -- a combination of factors likely to be replicated in insurgencies elsewhere.
Access Use copy Restrictions unspecified MiAaHDL
Reproduction Electronic reproduction. [S.l.] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. MiAaHDL
System Details Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. MiAaHDL
Processing Action digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve MiAaHDL
Language English.
Local Note eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America
JSTOR Books at JSTOR Open Access
Subject Postwar reconstruction -- Iraq.
Counterinsurgency -- Iraq.
Chronological Term Geschichte 2003-2006
Genre/Form Electronic book.
Electronic books.
Electronic books.
Added Author O'Connell, Edward.
National Defense Research Institute (U.S.)
Other Form: Print version: Pirnie, Bruce, 1940- Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006). Santa Monica, CA : Rand, 2008 9780833042972 0833042971 (DLC) 2008001579 (OCoLC)190843537
ISBN 9780833045843 (electronic bk.)
0833045849 (electronic bk.)
9780833042972 (pbk. ; alk. paper)
0833042971 (pbk. ; alk. paper)