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050  4 U241|b.B95 2007 
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082 04 355.02/18|222 
088    OP-178-OSD 
090    U241|b.B95 2007 
100 1  Byman, Daniel,|d1967-|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/
       names/n96104689 
245 10 Understanding proto-insurgencies /|cDaniel Byman. 
264  1 Santa Monica, CA :|bRand Corp.,|c2007. 
300    1 online resource (xiii, 60 pages). 
336    text|btxt|2rdacontent 
337    computer|bc|2rdamedia 
338    online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 
347    text file|bPDF|2rda 
490 1  Rand counterinsurgency study ;|vpaper 3 
490 1  Occasional paper (Rand Corporation) ;|vOP-178 
500    "Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense." 
500    "RAND National Defense Research Institute." 
504    Includes bibliographical references. 
505 0  Introduction -- Terrorism, insurgency, and proto-
       insurgency -- The role of violence -- The proto-
       insurgent's tasks -- The role of the state -- Defeating 
       proto-insurgencies -- Appendix A: Three cases of proto-
       insurgent success and failure -- Appendix B: Applying the 
       proto-insurgency concept to Saudi Arabia today -- Appendix
       C: Proto-insurgency indicators. 
520    To gain the size and capabilities of an insurgency, a 
       would-be insurgent movement must create a politically 
       relevant identity; it must espouse a cause that is popular
       beyond the group; it must gain dominance over rival 
       organizations; and it must find a sanctuary that provides 
       respite from police, intelligence, and military services. 
       Violence is instrumental in all the tasks proto-
       insurgencies seek to accomplish. However, violence can 
       also backfire on them, since few people support it. 
       Support from outside states offers numerous advantages to 
       groups seeking to become insurgencies. It can provide safe
       haven, money, training, and help with political 
       mobilization. It can also help groups overcome logistical 
       difficulties, hinder intelligence-gathering against them, 
       and legitimize them, making government delegitimization 
       efforts almost impossible. Outside states, however, often 
       deliberately try to control or even weaken the group and 
       at times can reduce its political popularity. The reaction
       of the state is often the most important factor in a 
       movement's overall success. Perhaps the best and most 
       efficient way to prevent proto-insurgents from gaining 
       ground is through in-group policing, since groups know 
       their own members and can enable arrests or other forms of
       pressure. The government can also promote rival 
       identities. Governments must, however, recognize the proto
       -insurgents' weaknesses and avoid overreaction that may 
       inadvertently strengthen them. The most obvious action for
       the United States is to anticipate the possibility of an 
       insurgency developing before it materializes. It can also 
       provide behind-the-scenes training and advisory programs 
       and can help inhibit outside support. 
546    English. 
590    eBooks on EBSCOhost|bEBSCO eBook Subscription Academic 
       Collection - North America 
590    JSTOR|bBooks at JSTOR Open Access 
650  0 Counterinsurgency.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/
       subjects/sh85033442 
650  0 Insurgency.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/
       sh85067073 
650  0 Terrorism|xPrevention.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/
       subjects/sh00007517 
650  7 Counterinsurgency.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/
       881325 
650  7 Insurgency.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/975461 
650  7 Terrorism|xPrevention.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast
       /1148123 
650  7 International relations.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/
       fast/977053 
651  0 United States|xForeign relations.|0https://id.loc.gov/
       authorities/subjects/sh85140058 
651  0 United States|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/
       n78095330|xInfluence.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/
       subjects/sh2002005444 
651  7 United States.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/1204155
655  0 Electronic books. 
655  4 Electronic books. 
710 2  National Defense Research Institute (U.S.)|0https://
       id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n91060525 
740 0  RAND (Online publications) 
776 08 |iPrint version:|aByman, Daniel, 1967-|tUnderstanding 
       proto-insurgencies.|dSanta Monica, CA : Rand Corp., 2007
       |z9780833041364|z0833041363|w(DLC)  2007034546
       |w(OCoLC)166290714 
830  0 Rand counterinsurgency study ;|0https://id.loc.gov/
       authorities/names/no2007129944|vpaper 3. 
830  0 Occasional paper (Rand Corporation) ;|0https://id.loc.gov/
       authorities/names/no2004031492|vOP-178. 
856 40 |uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/op178osd|zOnline 
       ebook. Open Access via JSTOR. 
856 40 |uhttps://rider.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://
       search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&
       db=nlebk&AN=213943|zOnline ebook via EBSCO. Access 
       restricted to current Rider University students, faculty, 
       and staff. 
901    MARCIVE 20231220 
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948    |d20190820|cJSTOR EBSCO|tJSTOROpenAccess 
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948    |d20171005|cEBSCO JSTOR|tebscoebooksacademic 
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948    |d20181012|cLTI|tlti-aup183 
994    92|bRID