| Description |
1 online resource. |
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text file |
| Series |
Oxford moral theory
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Oxford moral theory.
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| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
| Summary |
"The two main competing traditions in mainstream metaethics are cognitivism and non-cognitivism. The traditional view of this divide is that the cognitivist understands moral (and other normative) judgments as representational states (e.g. beliefs) whereas the non-cognitivist understands them instead as non-representational states - typically as desire-like states of some kind (e.g. emotions, plans, preferences). Because moral and other normative judgments genuinely do seem to have both belief-like and desire-like elements, this debate has seen each side going through seemingly endless epicycles to either accommodate or debunk what the other side explains easily. Recently, there has been an explosion of interest in theories which transcend these categories by holding that moral and other normative judgments are themselves constituted by both belief-like and desire-like elements and/or that moral and other normative judgments 'express' both belief-like and desire-like states. These are called hybrid theories. The papers in this volume, all new, both provide a guide to the state of the art in this debate and push it forward along numerous fronts"-- Provided by publisher. |
| Contents |
""Cover""; ""Series""; ""Having It Both Ways""; ""Copyright""; ""Contents""; ""Contributors""; ""Introduction""; ""Part One Optimism about Hybrid Theories""; ""1 How to Insult a Philosopher""; ""2 Expressivism, Nondeclaratives, and Success-Conditional Semantics""; ""3 Can a Hybrid Theory Have It Both Ways? Moral Thought, Open Questions, and Moral Motivation""; ""4 Attitudinal Requirements for Moral Thought and Language:Â Noncognitive Type-Generality""; ""5 Diachronic Hybrid Moral Realism""; ""6 The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement""; ""7 Hybrid Expressivism:Â How to Think about Meaning"" |
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""Part Two Pessimism about Hybrid Theories""""8 Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression, and Implicature""; ""9 Pure versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional Implicature""; ""10 (How) Is Ethical Neo-Expressivism a Hybrid View?""; ""11 Why Go Hybrid? AÂ Cognitivist Alternative to Hybrid Theories of Normative Judgment""; ""12 The Truth in Hybrid Semantics""; ""Index"" |
| Local Note |
eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America |
| Subject |
Metaethics.
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Metaethics. |
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PHILOSOPHY -- Ethics & Moral Philosophy. |
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PHILOSOPHY -- Social. |
| Added Author |
Fletcher, Guy, 1983- editor.
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Ridge, Michael (Michael R.), editor.
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| Added Title |
Hybrid theories and modern metaethics |
| Other Form: |
Print version: 9780199347582 0199347581 (DLC) 2014004731 |
| ISBN |
019934759X (electronic book) |
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9780199347599 (electronic book) |
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9780199347582 (hardback) |
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