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Bestseller
BestsellerE-book
Author Metzinger, Thomas, 1958-

Title Being no one : the self-model theory of subjectivity / Thomas Metzinger.

Publication Info. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, [2003]
©2003

Item Status

Description 1 online resource (xii, 699 pages)
Physical Medium polychrome
Description text file
Series Bradford book.
Note "A Bradford book."
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references (pages 635-662) and indexes.
Contents 1. Questions -- 2. Tools I -- 3. Representational deep structure of phenomenal experience -- 4. Neurophenomenological case studies I -- 5. Tools II -- 6. Representational deep Structure of the phenomenal first-person perspective -- 7. Neurophenomenological case studies II -- 8. Preliminary answers.
Summary According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds.
Local Note eBooks on EBSCOhost EBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America
Subject Consciousness.
Consciousness.
Cognitive neuroscience.
Cognitive neuroscience.
Self psychology.
Self psychology.
Consciousness.
Cognition.
Neuropsychology.
Self Concept.
Genre/Form Electronic books.
Other Form: Print version: Metzinger, Thomas, 1958- Being no one. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2003 0262134179 (DLC) 2002071759 (OCoLC)49892529
ISBN 9780262279727 (electronic book)
026227972X (electronic book)
0585456690 (electronic book)
9780585456690 (electronic book)
0262134179
9780262134170
0262134179
9780262134170