Lessons from the Army's Future Combat Systems program / Christopher G. Pernin, Elliot Axelband, Jeffrey A. Drezner, Brian B. Dille, John Gordon IV, Bruce J. Held, K. Scott McMahon, Walter L. Perry, Christopher Rizzi, Akhil R. Shah, Peter A. Wilson, Jerry M. Sollinger.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 305-330).
Contents
Introduction -- Background of the Future Combat Systems program -- Cost, schedule, and performance of the FCS program over time -- How the Army generated requirements for the Future Combat Systems -- The evolution and adjustment of requirements after milestone B -- FCS program management -- Contracts -- Technology choices and development in FCS -- Summary -- Appendix A. Select interviewees for this study -- Appendix B. Congressional decrements and scrutiny -- Appendix C. FCS requirements data and methodology -- Appendix D. Selected technology transfer agreements between PM FCS and Army S&T -- Appendix E. Where the FCS systems are today.
Summary
The Future Combat Systems (FCS) program was the largest and most ambitious planned acquisition program in the Army’s history. The FCS was intended to field not just a system, but an entire brigade, a system of systems, with novel technologies integrated by means of an advanced wireless network. Moreover, the FCS-equipped brigade would operate with new doctrine that was being developed and tested along with the materiel components of the unit. The FCS was central to Army modernization plans. In 2009, the FCS program was cancelled, and some of its efforts transitioned to follow-on programs. In 2010, the Army’s Acquisition Executive asked RAND Arroyo Center to conduct an after-action analysis of the FCS program in order to leverage its successes and learn from its problems. This report documents the program’s history and draws lessons from multiple perspectives, including the conditions leading up to the program, requirements generation and development, program management and execution, and technologies.
