LEADER 00000cam a2200661Ki 4500 001 ocn776163672 003 OCoLC 005 20190405013638.1 006 m o d 007 cr cnu---unuuu 008 120213s2012 nyua ob 001 0 eng d 020 9781139206600|q(electronic book) 020 1139206605|q(electronic book) 020 9780511973031|q(electronic book) 020 0511973039|q(electronic book) 020 9781139205023|q(electronic book) 020 1139205021|q(electronic book) 020 |z9781107096424 020 |z1107096421 035 (OCoLC)776163672 040 N$T|beng|erda|epn|cN$T|dUIU|dYDXCP|dOCLCQ|dOCLCF|dOCLCQ |dGZN|dHEBIS|dOCLCO|dOCLCA|dUAB|dOCLCQ|dOCLCA|dINT|dOCLCQ 049 RIDW 050 4 QA76.9.M35|bT36 2012eb 072 7 COM|x060040|2bisacsh 072 7 COM|x043050|2bisacsh 072 7 COM|x053000|2bisacsh 082 04 005.8|223 090 QA76.9.M35|bT36 2012eb 100 1 Tambe, Milind,|d1965-|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/ names/n96012813 245 10 Security and game theory :|balgorithms, deployed systems, lessons learned /|cMilind Tambe. 264 1 New York :|bCambridge University Press,|c2012. 300 1 online resource (xiv, 319 pages) :|billustrations 336 text|btxt|2rdacontent 337 computer|bc|2rdamedia 338 online resource|bcr|2rdacarrier 340 |gpolychrome|2rdacc 347 text file|2rdaft 504 Includes bibliographical references (pages 297-310) and index. 505 00 |g1.|tIntroduction and overview of security games / |rMilind Tambe and Maish Jain --|gPart I.|tSecurity Experts' Perspective:|g2.|tLAX: terror target: the history, the reason, the countermeasure /|rErroll Southers;|g3. |tMaritime transportation system security and the use of game theory: a perfect match to address operational and tactical concerns /|rJoe DiRenzo III, Ben Maule, Erik Jensen and Fred Bertsch IV --|gPart II.|tDeployed Applications: g4. Deployed ARMOR protection: the application of a game theoretic model for security at the Los Angeles International Airport /|rJames Pita [and others];|g5.|tIRIS: a tool for strategic security allocation in transportation networks /|rJason Tsai [and others];|g6.|tGUARDS: game theoretic security allocation on a national scale /|rJames Pita [and others] --|gPart III.|tEfficient Algorithms for Massive Security Games:|g7. |tCoordinating randomized policies for increasing security of agent systems /|rPraveen Paruchuri [and others];|g8. |tComputing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games /|rChristopher Kiekintveld [and others];|g9.|tSecurity games with arbitrary schedules: a branch-and-price approach /|rManish Jain [and others] -- |gPart IV.|tFuture Research:|g10.|tEffective solutions for real-world Stackelberg games: when agents must deal with human uncertainties /|rJames Pita;|g11.|tApproximation methods for infinite Bayesian Stackelberg games: modeling distributional payoff uncertainty /|rChristopher Kiekintveld, Janusz Marecki and Milind Tambe;|g12. Stackelberg versus Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness /|rZhengyu Yin [and others];|g13.|tEvaluating deployed decision- support systems for security: challenges, arguments, and approaches /|rMatthew E. Taylor, Christopher Kiekintveld and Milind Tambe. 520 "Global threats of terrorism, drug-smuggling and other crimes have led to a significant increase in research on game theory for security. Game theory provides a sound mathematical approach to deploy limited security resources to maximize their effectiveness. A typical approach is to randomize security schedules to avoid predictability, with the randomization using artificial intelligence techniques to take into account the importance of different targets and potential adversary reactions. This book distills the forefront of this research to provide the first and only study of long-term deployed applications of game theory for security for key organizations such as the Los Angeles International Airport police and the US Federal Air Marshals Service. The author and his research group draw from their extensive experience working with security officials to intelligently allocate limited security resources to protect targets, outlining the applications of these algorithms in research and the real world"-- |cProvided by publisher. 588 0 Print version record. 590 eBooks on EBSCOhost|bEBSCO eBook Subscription Academic Collection - North America 650 0 Computer security.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/ subjects/sh90001862 650 0 Game theory.|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/ sh85052941 650 0 Security, International|0https://id.loc.gov/authorities/ subjects/sh85119471|xMathematical models.|0https:// id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh2002007921 650 7 Computer security.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/ 872484 650 7 Game theory.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/fast/937501 650 7 Security, International|xMathematical models.|2fast|0https ://id.worldcat.org/fast/1110905 650 7 Security, International.|2fast|0https://id.worldcat.org/ fast/1110895 655 4 Electronic books. 776 08 |iPrint version:|aTambe, Milind, 1965-|tSecurity and game theory.|dNew York : Cambridge University Press, 2012 |z9781107096424|w(DLC) 2011038733|w(OCoLC)751798356 856 40 |uhttps://rider.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http:// search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site& db=nlebk&AN=414519|zOnline eBook via EBSCO. Access restricted to current Rider University students, faculty, and staff. 856 42 |3Instructions for reading/downloading the EBSCO version of this eBook|uhttp://guides.rider.edu/ebooks/ebsco 901 MARCIVE 20231220 948 |d20190507|cEBSCO|tEBSCOebooksacademic NEW 4-5-19 7552 |lridw 994 92|bRID